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Retroactivity and Appointments
Andrew C. Michaels*
The current law of retroactivity in the Appointments Clause context is
confused, resulting in significant practical consequences, such as when
courts unnecessarily invalidate prior administrative decisions after
judicially removing an unconstitutionality, even where the prior statutory
misrepresentation had no apparent effect on the invalidated actions. The
Supreme Court has recently been active in the Appointments Clause area
without discussing the attendant retroactivity issues, which lower courts are
confronting with increased frequency. This article reviews the doctrine of
retroactivity and appointments, discusses the relevant academic literature,
and proposes a coherent and sensible framework for courts to use when
faced with these important questions.
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INTRODUCTION
The current law surrounding retroactivity in the Appointments Clause
context is a mess, one that this Article aims to help clean up. Retroactivity
doctrine is somewhat confusing in general, but in the Appointments
Clause context it is even more so. Although the issues may seem abstract
and philosophical,1 they can have very practical consequences. When a
court holds that certain administrative judges were not constitutionally
appointed, do their prior actions become invalid? That is the primary
question dealt with in this Article, and the answer depends in part on
whether and how the court deals with the constitutional problem.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
recently held in Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew that Administrative Patent
Judges (APJs) had not been properly appointed in accord with the
Appointments Clause, but the court “fixed” the unconstitutionality by
striking statutory removal restrictions as applied to those judges.2
However, instead of properly viewing the fix as retroactive, the court
improperly held that dozens of pending appeals from lengthy and
expensive agency proceedings before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) had to be vacated and remanded for new
additional agency hearings, even though it is highly unlikely that the
removal restrictions had any effect or caused any harm in these matters,
and there was not even any serious allegation of actual harm.3 This
wasteful Kafkaesque multiplication of bureaucratic hearings was thought
to be required by law, but in fact it was both unnecessary and imprudent
under the retroactivity doctrine as properly understood.
The amount of waste that can occur due to such misunderstanding is
substantial. The Arthrex decision has led to somewhere in the
neighborhood of one hundred unnecessary remands from appeals of
1. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“That
original and enduring American perception of the judicial role sprang not from the philosophy of
Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Blackstone, which viewed retroactivity as an inherent
characteristic of the judicial power, a power ‘not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain
and expound the old one.’”).
2. See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex 141 U.S. 549 (2020). “Removal restrictions” refers to
congressionally imposed restrictions on the president’s ability to remove certain officers; an officer
with removal restrictions (or protections) cannot be removed at will, but rather only for cause. See
infra notes 173–177 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 441 and accompanying text.
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USPTO proceedings, and such remands were ordered to be heard by a
new panel of three APJs.4 These legally improper remands will thus not
only cause substantial delay to parties attempting to determine the
validity of patent rights, but also result in wasted resources likely totaling
in the tens of millions of dollars.5 This pure waste of resources is caused
entirely by the Federal Circuit’s perhaps understandable confusion with
respect to this admittedly tricky doctrine, highlighting the importance of
clarifying the law in this area. The Arthrex case is currently being
reconsidered before the Supreme Court,6 and the Court thus has an
opportunity to both improve the efficiency of the system by eliminating
this waste and clarify the law of retroactivity and appointments to prevent
similar blunders from occurring in the future.
This issue however is far from limited to the Federal Circuit.
Retroactivity issues have arisen relatively frequently in the Appointments
Clause context in recent years,7 yet the law of retroactivity and
appointments remains confused. Very similar issues also arise in the
context of other closely related constitutional challenges to agency
structure based on Article II or separation of powers. For example, in
Seila Law v. CFPB, the Supreme Court recently severed removal
restrictions to fix what it found to be a constitutional problem with the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), raising questions about
the extent to which prior CFPB actions remain valid, without addressing
those questions.8 In this and other contexts, various courts will
undoubtedly be faced with these sorts of retroactivity questions soon and
would do well to apply a consistent and coherent framework. This Article
attempts to provide such a framework.
The doctrine of retroactivity holds that when a court shifts or alters the
law, it is in theory not actually changing the law, it is merely clarifying
what the law always was, vindicating the law from misrepresentation.
The doctrine is thus based on the fiction that courts find law rather than
make it, known as the declaratory theory of law. Retroactivity can
become especially complex and confusing in the Appointments Clause
4. See infra note 408.
5. See infra note 386.
6. See infra note 460 and accompanying text.
7. See Elizabeth Earle Beske, Backdoor Balancing and the Consequences of Legal Change, 94
WASH. L. REV. 645, 693 (2019) (“The Court’s struggle to reconcile its dueling impulses to soften
the blow of disruptive legal change and adhere to principles of adjudicative retroactivity is likely
to erupt again soon in a new context. . . . After decades of doctrinal repose, the Court has decided
three significant Appointments Clause cases in the past eight years.”); see generally Lucia v. SEC,
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Arthrex, 941 F.3d 1320; Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838
(1st Cir. 2019).
8. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (severing removal
restrictions) (discussed in Section I.C.4).
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context. Where a court finds that certain administrative judges were not
constitutionally appointed, the proper mode of analysis depends on
whether the court “fixes” the unconstitutionality by “altering” the
relevant statute; if it doesn’t, the administrative judges were
unconstitutional at the time of prior decisions. The agency may then take
action, such as ratifying prior actions or properly reappointing the judges,
to fix the problem prospectively. In this situation, prior actions of such
judges that have become final after judicial appeal are protected by the
finality doctrine, but actions still pending on appeal are open to question
unless the court chooses to employ the rarely used de facto validity
doctrine.9
However, if the court “fixes” the problem, say by striking and severing
removal protections on the administrative judges so as to render them
“inferior officers” who were properly appointed, the analysis must be
different, both conceptually and practically. The fix—like any judicial
“change” in the law—should at least presumptively be considered
retroactive such that the administrative judges were always
constitutional. In other words, the fix was not actually a change in the
law; the court was merely clarifying what the law always was, in accord
with the judicial power as rooted in Article III and the retroactivity
doctrine. The courts may still vacate and remand pending appeals from
such judges as a matter of remedial discretion where the equities so
dictate, such as if it appears that the prior misrepresentation of the law
was somehow relied on to the detriment of litigants, but it need not do so,
and should not absent persuasive equitable reasons.10
The fact that the relevant change in law sometimes—but only
sometimes—fixes rather than invalidates the law is part of what makes
application of retroactivity doctrine particularly confusing in this context.
This is coupled with the fact that the Court has applied standing and
specifically traceability requirements rather loosely in the Appointments
Clause and related contexts, such that often the old misrepresentation of
the law dictating an unconstitutional agency structure will not have
actually impacted the pending cases at all.
This is not to say that an Appointments Clause or similar structural
issue could never actually impact agency actions; it certainly could, but
in light of the loosened traceability requirements, such impact cannot
simply be assumed, as no showing of actual impact or harm is necessary
to raise this sort of challenge. And in many cases, there will have been no
such impact, such as in Arthrex where there is no reason to think that any
of the dozens of remanded matters would have been decided any
9. See infra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining the de facto validity doctrine).
10. See infra notes 96–100, 309 and accompanying text.
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differently if the relevant APJs had known that they were in fact
removable at will. The USPTO agency proceedings at issue in Arthrex
generally turn on the technical issues of whether certain patent claims are
anticipated or rendered obvious by certain prior art references; political
influence in these cases would be extremely rare, especially because the
decisions are subject to Federal Circuit review on the merits. As such, the
agency is exercising very little political discretion in these cases, so it
seems quite unlikely that the cases would turn on whether the APJs were
removable at will by executive branch officials. Where the agency actions
on review are primarily legal rather than political in character, this should
weigh against a discretionary remand in general, and should have been
considered by the Federal Circuit in determining whether a remand was
prudent in each individual case.
The Federal Circuit’s key error in Arthrex was treating the remands as
automatic and mandatory rather than discretionary, and thus failing to
recognize and exercise its equitable discretion in determining whether to
remand. This error stemmed from an apparent failure to fully grasp
fundamental retroactivity principles. What some courts have not
adequately understood, and what this Article will show, is that when a
judicial alteration of the relevant statute removes the unconstitutionality,
that fix should be retroactively applied such that the agency’s prior
actions taken under the “old” representation of law are not necessarily
invalid and should generally be upheld unless there was some likely
reliance on or actual harm caused by the prior misrepresentation of law.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I analyzes current doctrine:
Section I.A summarizes the foundations and limits of retroactivity;
Section I.B discusses the evolution of modern general retroactivity
doctrine, focusing on the federal civil context; and Section I.C explores
how retroactivity has been applied when courts find unconstitutionalities
in administrative agency structure, focusing on the Appointments Clause
and other closely related contexts. Part II reviews and comments on the
relevant academic literature on retroactivity, beginning with classic
scholarship in Section II.A, and then moving to modern scholarship in
Section II.B, with a focus on the Appointments Clause and patent law
contexts; in doing so, it teases out and elaborates further on the theoretical
underpinnings of this Article’s proposed approach. Part III considers the
Arthrex situation as a case study illustrating the practical consequences
of misunderstanding the law of retroactivity and appointments by
showing that the Federal Circuit’s improper analysis led it to order many
wasteful and unnecessary rehearings based on its mistaken belief that the
relevant APJs were “not constitutionally appointed at the time” they had
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previously issued final appealable decisions.11
Based on the preceding discussion, this Article then concludes by
providing a framework for proper analysis of retroactivity in the
Appointments Clause and related contexts, in the hopes of improving
doctrinal coherence in this area,12 and so that courts might vacate prior
agency actions only in appropriate circumstances. The proposed
framework ensures that courts have an appropriate degree of discretion
in fashioning relief, while maintaining consistency with both
foundational retroactivity principles and the current doctrine of
retroactivity and appointments.
Taking a brief step back, what follows is essentially a description of a
complex doctrinal puzzle that is currently confounding courts with some
practical consequence, along with a proposed answer to that puzzle. From
a purely positive doctrinal perspective, the approach proposed may not
be the only possible one, but it is likely the most doctrinally coherent one,
and it is reasonable from a normative perspective. Even if some other
constructed theoretical approach might arguably be preferable from a
purely normative perspective, maintaining doctrinal consistency has its
own benefits, as will be discussed herein, for retroactivity is partially
rooted in and closely tied to stare decisis and related values such as
stability and predictability.
I. FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. The Useful Partial Fiction of Retroactivity
In the normal case, full retroactivity goes without saying and is no
fiction; the court applies its statement of the law to the parties before it,
even though the events at issue took place before the court’s decision.13
This follows naturally from Article III and the role of the judiciary, which
is to decide concrete cases and controversies after the fact.14 The law as
stated by the court must generally apply to those past events, and it does
11. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1338–39.
12. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L. J. 105, 116 (1993) (citing NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 106 (1978)).
13. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 538 (1991) (“In most decisions
of this Court, retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes without saying.”); Harper
v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 114 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (United States Constitutional provision outlining judicial
powers and jurisdiction); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007) (explaining that
Article III’s case or controversy requirement is not an “empty formality”); Samuel Beswick,
Retroactive Adjudication, 130 YALE L.J. 276, 279 (2020) (“Disputes over rights, adjudicated by
courts, can only be resolved from the perspective of hindsight, and they cannot feasibly be insulated
from developments in precedent. Precedent today necessarily informs our understanding of past
rights.”).
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because the law as stated in a judicial decision is generally not new; it
was the law before and will continue to be after. In this sense, retroactivity
rests on and fosters continuity in the law. But the continuity is not
perfect—all would admit that courts in some cases do shift the law in a
real sense, and it is in such cases that retroactivity becomes an issue and
something of a fiction.15 As will be explained here, applying the
retroactivity doctrine, the fiction is that the change was not actually a
change; the court was still merely stating what the law always was, even
if that statement may arguably contradict prior reasonable understandings
of what the law was.
There are limits on the doctrine of judicial retroactivity. The most
prominent limit is finality: if a prior case was finally decided under the
“old law,” a judicial change or clarification in the law will generally not
allow a reopening of the case.16 Although this Article primarily focuses
on the civil context, it is also true that in the criminal context, new rules
will generally not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas
corpus.17 This Teague doctrine also reflects the finality limitation, that
“[n]ew legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to
cases already closed.”18 That is, under Teague, finality will generally take
precedence over retroactivity in the context of a collateral attack on a final
criminal judgment, though the Court has stated that “[n]o such difficulty
exists in the civil arena, in which there is little opportunity for collateral
attack of final judgments.”19
Statutes of limitations and the doctrine of laches also provide limits on
the extent to which new cases based on prior events may be brought after
a judicial legal change.20 Additionally, courts at least arguably may in
rare cases choose to make a decision prospective only in effect, and
importantly, if there has been likely reliance on a prior misrepresentation
of the law, courts have the remedial discretion to undo or mitigate harm

15. See James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 534 (“It is only when the law changes in some respect that
an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained . . . .”).
16. See id. at 541 (“Of course, retroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need for
finality . . . .”).
17. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989) (holding that a habeas corpus petitioner
generally cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy where doing so would require the habeas court to
apply a new rule of criminal law retroactively).
18. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995) (explaining the application of
the Teague doctrine).
19. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 540 (explaining the applicability of new rules retroactively
applied to habeas corpus).
20. See id. at 541 (“[O]nce a suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose,
a new rule cannot reopen the door already closed.”); see also Beswick, supra note 14, at 283
(explaining that “courts can invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, among other possible tools, to
constrain the scope of litigation.”).
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caused such reliance.21
Judicial retroactivity is partially rooted in the constitutional principle
of separation of powers: prospective lawmaking is generally the role of
the legislative branch, not the judicial branch.22 This is thought to be
fundamental, as the Supreme Court has stated: “The principle that statutes
operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate
retrospectively, is familiar to every law student.”23 Although Congress
can in some circumstances legislate retroactively, new statutes are
presumed to operate only prospectively.24 But courts, at least in theory,
do not make law, they merely clarify and state what the law has always
been. Under this “declaratory theory of law,”25 even when overruling a
case, a court is not exactly changing the law, it is merely freeing the law
from a prior misrepresentation.26
Similarly, retroactivity highlights differences between the executive
branch and the judicial branch. An agency can change its enforcement
policy prospectively through administrative adjudication or rulemaking,
but generally cannot make such changes retroactive, as to do so may run
afoul of fair notice due process principles.27 The judicial branch, on the
other hand, generally must make any “change” retroactive, under the
fiction that it is not actually a change but rather a statement of what the
law always has been. The executive branch agencies do not need to
indulge in this fiction; they may openly suddenly change policy
prospectively, (so long as they remain within the reasonable statutory
bounds, comply with due process, and adequately justify the change).28
21. See Beswick, supra note 14, at 328 (“[J]udgments will always operate retroactively for the
purpose of determining what the law was, but courts may employ equitable considerations to curb
the remedial impact of unexpected judicial changes in the law.”) (emphasis in original); see
generally infra Section I.B.
22. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Fully
retroactive decisionmaking was considered a principal distinction between the judicial and the
legislative power . . . .”) (citing T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 91 (1868)).
23. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994) (quoting United States
v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)) (explaining how the principle of retroactivity should
be seen as fundamental).
24. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 279 (1994) (“[T]he traditional presumption
against truly ‘retrospective’ application of a statute.”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1997) (explaining the
retroactivity doctrine and proposing a new framework for retroactivity analysis to better apply
retroactivity to current law).
25. See James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 535–36 (highlighting an application of retroactivity).
26. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 107 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] judge overruling [a former]
decision would ‘not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from
misrepresentation.’”) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69–70 (1765)).
27. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012) (explaining the fair notice
grounds of the Due Process Clause).
28. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 517 (2009) (“There is no doubt that the
Commission knew it was making a change.”).
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This allows the executive branch to shift policy more quickly and
drastically as compared with the courts, which must (or at least should)
strive to maintain a greater degree of continuity.
The declaratory theory of law is openly recognized to be something of
a fiction even by some of its major proponents;29 courts do in a real sense
make or at least shift the law, but they “make it as judges make it, which
is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow
be.”30 It could also be called inherently formalistic in that it seems to
presuppose that there is a single right answer to legal questions, such that
anyone who studies an issue closely enough should be able to find the
correct law, even when it goes against a case that is “wrong” and will thus
eventually be overruled or a statute that will eventually be struck down
as unconstitutional.31 As the legal realists showed, law is not actually
quite so determinate as that—there are hard cases that do not have a single
clear right answer, though there are also many easy ones that do.32
Nevertheless, one can recognize a fiction but still find it useful to indulge
in,33 and this particular fiction is thought to be useful for at least two
reasons.
First, it allows courts to avoid the problematic question of the effective
date of the “new” law. If an appellate judicial decision were generally
seen as prospectively changing the law, when would the change take
effect? Is it when an appellate panel decision is released? When the
mandate issues? When the petition for rehearing en banc is denied? When
the petition for certiorari is denied? As has been observed, this conscious
confrontation of the question of an “effective date” of a judicial decision
“smacks of the legislative process.”34 Retroactivity allows courts to avoid
29. See James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so
naïve (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”).
30. Id.
31. Cf. Harper, 509 U.S. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that prospective decisionmaking “was formulated in the heyday of legal realism . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L. J.
218, 222 (1961) (“A majority of the cases that came before his court, [Judge Cardozo] tells us,
‘could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one,’ since ‘the law and its
application alike are plain’ . . . .”) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 164 (1921)); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 68, n.16 (1965) (“For it is certainly true that courts
in general handle the vast bulk of cases by application of preexisting law, . . . informed estimates
put the figure at close to 90%.”) (citing Friendly, supra note 32, at 222)).
33. Cf. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 63 n.29 (explaining the importance of discussing the
sophistication or simplicity of a law or theory).
34. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 107–08 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Mishkin, supra note 32, at
65); see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (criticizing
prospective overruling as “an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication
but in effect of legislation.”).
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this question, under the fiction that the newly clarified law was always
the correct law; to the extent that prior cases suggested otherwise, they
were wrong and were simply misrepresentations of the law, like a mirage.
The effective date issue also can undermine the principle that similarly
situated parties should be treated the same,35 because it can make the
outcome of a case turn on whether a particular event occurred before or
after the rather arbitrary “effective date” of a judicial change in the law,
so by allowing courts to avoid this issue, retroactivity fosters fairness in
this sense.
Second, retroactivity strengthens stare decisis, the familiar benefits of
which include fostering predictability and consistency in the law, as well
as integrity in the judicial process.36 By forcing judges to write under the
fiction that their current statement of the law was always the law,
retroactivity requires that judges adhere closely enough to precedent that
they may plausibly do so. But if a court is overruling a prior a case, then
the court must break with this fiction; it must openly acknowledge the
change. In doing so, the court must say that the prior case was wrong, it
was a misrepresentation of the law. The prior case was not bad law like
a legislatively repealed statute might be, rather, the prior case was not
law.37 The court’s new statement of the law must generally apply to
events that took place before, when the public may still have been under
the misguided impression given by the old cases.38 This can lead to
unfairness, undermining the notion that the public can rely on what courts
and statutes say, and facing this unfairness is part of what makes courts
hesitant to overrule precedent.39
35. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 595–96 (1987) (“To fail to treat
similar cases similarly, it is argued, is arbitrary, and consequently unjust or unfair.”).
36. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (“[Stare decisis] promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”) (quoting
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)); see also Richard Re, Narrowing Precedent in the
Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1875–85 (2014) (listing “five values often linked to
stare decisis” as correctness, practicality, candor, fidelity, and fit).
37. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 107 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 70 (1765)) (explaining that when a judge overrules a decision, they are not saying
the decision was bad law, but rather that the overruled decision was not law).
38. However, as discussed further, where actions were taken that could not have been taken
absent prior misrepresentations of the law, such actions should generally be undone as a matter of
remedy. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 250 Va. 184, 192 (Va. 1995) (refunding taxes paid
under a taxation statute later found unconstitutional); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928
(1983) (affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision in blocking Chadha’s deportation, which would
not have occurred absent the unconstitutional House veto of the Attorney General’s decision to
allow Chadha to remain in the United States).
39. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 108 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the doctrine of
prospective decision-making removed “one of the great inherent restraints upon this Court’s
departing from the field of interpretation to enter that of lawmaking,”) (quoting James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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Similarly, when a court interprets a statute, it generally treats the
interpretation as retroactive; that was always what the statute meant, even
if prior courts had indicated otherwise.40 This idea generally seems to
hold as well when a court strikes a statute as unconstitutional; the statute
is void ab initio, it is as though the statute never existed to begin with.41
The general principal of judicial retroactivity holds even when a judicial
decision upsets investment-backed expectations,42 although courts do
have a degree of discretion to remedy reasonable reliance on prior
representations of law.43
So when a court overrules a case or strikes a statue, the fictional nature
of the declaratory theory upon which retroactivity is based is brought to
light. Courts accordingly usually try to avoid doing these things by simply
adhering to precedent, or at least ruling in a manner plausibly consistent
with precedent, and with respect to statutes, construing them, if possible,
to avoid unconstitutionality.44 Retroactivity’s fortification of stare decisis
40. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994) (“A judicial
construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as
after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136
S. Ct. 463, 469 (2015) (“[J]udicial construction of a statute ordinarily applies retroactively.”);
United States v. Ochoa, 861 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have adopted the view that
‘statutory interpretation decisions are fully retroactive.’”) (quoting United States v. Aguilera-Rios,
769 F.3d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 2014)); Dixon v. Dormire, 263 F.3d 774, 781 (8th Cir. 2001)
(explaining the retroactive interpretation); Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (nonprecedential).
41. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (“We have
‘the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment.’”) (quoting Massachusetts v.
Melon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759–60 (1995)
(“In fact, what a court does with regard to an unconstitutional law is simply to ignore it. It decides
the case ‘disregarding the unconstitutional law. . . . because a law repugnant to the Constitution ‘is
void, and is as no law.’”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880)); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) (“[W]e must apply
today’s holdings—both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the
Sentencing Act—to all cases on direct review”). The Court’s “remedial interpretation” in Booker
included striking and severing several provisions of the Sentencing Act; see id. at 245 (“We
conclude that this provision must be severed and excised, as must one other statutory section . . . .”);
see also United States ex rel. Williams v. Preiser, 497 F.2d 337, 338–39 (2d Cir. 1974) (“New York
stresses that Roe was a surprise holding and that retroactive application would disregard the
justifiable reliance in 1966 that § 1050 always would be good law. . . . [However, §] 1050 is, ‘in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.’”) (quoting Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886)).
42. See Fisch, supra note 24, at 1075 n.121 (“[T]he Court has never taken the view that judicial
changes in the law are subject to the Takings Clause. . . . Nor has the Court, in the modern era, read
the Contract Clause to invalidate state judicial decisions undermining contractual expectations.”).
43. See discussion infra Sections I.B.2, I.B.4 (analysis of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, and Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde) (discussing courts’
discretion with respect to remedying reasonable reliance on prior law with respect to retroactivity).
44. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012) (“[I]t is well
established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution,
courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422
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thus helps “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.”45
A brief example may be helpful. In Flood v. Kuhn,46 the Supreme
Court considered whether to overrule prior cases that held that Major
League Baseball (MLB) was not engaged in interstate commerce and thus
was beyond the reach of antitrust law. The Court acknowledged that in
modern times, it is fairly clear that MLB is interstate commerce, and that
if it were writing on a clean slate, it would hold so such that MLB would
be subject to antitrust law.47 But doing so would have required the Court
to overrule prior cases and retroactively apply the new holding, such that
MLB could have been open to antitrust suits based on prior conduct.48 As
the Court had previously observed, the business of baseball had been left
for decades “to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to
existing antitrust legislation,” that understanding being based on longstanding case law.49 MLB had been acting in accordance with the prior
cases holding that it was not subject to antitrust law, but had the Court
overruled those cases, it would have been saying that those cases were
always misrepresentations of the law, so baseball was always subject to
antitrust law. The resulting potential unfairness to MLB, including the
“flood of litigation” and “harassment that would ensue,” in part
convinced the Court to adhere to, rather than overrule, its prior
precedent.50 The ability to bring actions based on past events would have
been mitigated by the relevant statute of limitations, but the flood of cases
may still have been substantial.
Justice Marshall dissented and suggested that the Court could avoid
this unfairness and still bring baseball in line with the Court’s modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence by overruling the prior cases only
prospectively.51 In his view, “[b]aseball should be covered by the
antitrust laws beginning with this case and henceforth, unless Congress

(2019) (“‘Overruling precedent is never a small matter.’. . . Adherence to precedent is a ‘foundation
stone of the rule of law.’”); see also Noah Feldman, Why Precedent Won’t Protect ‘Roe’, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (July 2, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/07/02/why-precedent-wontprotect-roe-v-wade/?lp_txn_id=1011190 [https://perma.cc/UGL3-6VQD] (“In the classic
common-law system, judges operated under the convention that they were finding law that
belonged in common to all, not making it. In that setting, the doctrine of precedent was more or
less fundamental to the whole law-finding undertaking.”).
45. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
judgment) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
46. See generally Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
47. Id. at 282.
48. Id. at 283.
49. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
50. Flood, 407 U.S. at 278–79.
51. Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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decides otherwise.”52 At the time, the Court had recently stated, “in rare
cases, decisions construing federal statutes might be denied full
retroactive effect, as for instance where this Court overrules its own
construction of a statute.”53 As will be discussed below, however, the
Court subsequently threw cold water on this doctrine allowing for
occasional prospective overruling such that, although it at least arguably
remains, the use of prospective overruling is strongly discouraged.
As another more recent but less explicit example, the Supreme Court
in Kisor v. Wilkie recently considered overruling Auer/Seminole Rock
deference,54 but declined to do so largely due to stare decisis concerns.55
Although the Court did not directly discuss the retroactivity doctrine,
examination reveals that it may have played an underlying role in the
Court’s analysis, illustrating how retroactivity concerns can be present in
the background even when not explicitly discussed.
Auer and Seminole Rock held that courts should generally defer to
agencies’ reasonable readings of genuinely ambiguous regulations.56
Over the past decades the doctrine has been applied by the Court in
dozens of cases interpreting agency regulations, and by lower courts in
“thousands” of cases.57 But if the Court were to overrule Auer deference
and hold that courts should not defer to such agency interpretations, this
“would cast doubt on many settled constructions” of agency regulations
where deference to the agency’s view had been given.58 Applying
retroactivity, overruling Auer deference would mean not only that it
should not be applied going forward, but that the doctrine was never
really the law, so any case that had relied on the doctrine to interpret a
regulation was in error. This would not necessarily mean that such
interpretations were incorrect (perhaps the error was harmless), but courts
would be forced to “‘wrestle with whether or not Auer’ had actually made
a difference.”59 The Court observed that it “is the rare overruling that
52. Id.
53. Id. n.5 (citing United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970)).
54. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2019) (considering whether to overrule Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)).
55. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422–23 (“[S]tare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s position.”).
56. Id. at 2408.
57. See id. at 2411 nn.2–3 (highlighting the significant number of cases where the doctrine has
been applied); id. at 2422 (“This Court alone has applied Auer or Seminole Rock in dozens of cases,
and lower courts have done so thousands of times.”).
58. Id. at 2422.
59. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400); see also Transcript
of Oral Argument at 47, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400) (Solicitor General agreeing that “every single
regulation that’s currently on the books whose interpretation has been established under Seminole
Rock now [would have] to be relitigated anew.”); cf. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“[D]ecisions construing particular regulations might retain stare decisis
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introduces so much instability into so many areas of law, all in one
blow.”60 If the Court were to consider overruling Chevron deference as a
number of Justices have called for,61 similar concerns would be present,
likely a fortiori.
B. Evolution of Retroactivity Doctrine
The practice of judicial retroactivity traces back hundreds of years.62
The following review of case law on retroactivity will show that the
possibility of prospective judicial decision-making enjoyed a period of
ascendancy in the 1960s and 1970s, but was walked back (though
probably not completely eliminated) in the 1980s and 1990s. Although
criminal law may be mentioned in passing, the focus of the following
review, like that of this Article, is primarily on the federal civil context.
The debate around retroactivity goes to the heart of the judicial role and
has appropriately been called “one of the great jurisprudential debates of
the twentieth century.”63
1. Chevron Oil
The Supreme Court in Chevron Oil v. Huson recognized that the
judicial retroactivity doctrine is not absolute, refusing to retroactively
apply case law to the detriment of a plaintiff who had reasonably relied
on a prior different representation of the law.64 The plaintiff was injured
in 1965 while working on a Chevron drilling rig off the coast of Louisiana
and then brought suit in 1968 in federal district court. At the time, a line
of federal court decisions had interpreted the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act65 to make admiralty law applicable to the action, under which
the action’s timeliness was not disputed.66 But then, during pretrial
discovery in 1969, the Supreme Court decided Rodrigue v. Aetna
effect even if the Court announced that it would no longer adhere to Auer’s interpretive
methodology.”).
60. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422.
61. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of petition for certiorari) (questioning Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)); cf. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2017) (“[W]hether Chevron should
remain is a question we may leave for another day.”).
62. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Judicial
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.”); cf. Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 623 n.7 (“While Blackstone is always cited as the foremost exponent of the
declaratory theory, a very similar view was stated by Sir Matthew Hale in his History of the
Common Law which was published 13 years before the birth of Blackstone.”) (citing GRAY,
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 206 (1909)).
63. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1377 (N.M. 1994).
64. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 112–15 (1971).
65. See generally Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. [hereinafter
Lands Act].
66. See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 99 (discussing prior Lands Act interpretations).

2021]

Retroactivity and Appointments

641

Casualty & Surety Co.,67 which interpreted the Lands Act differently to
hold that it does not make admiralty law applicable. In light of Rodrigue,
the district court found that Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations
applied and dismissed the plaintiff’s action as time barred.
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the Lands Act as interpreted
in Rodrigue made Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations the
applicable law to personal injury actions such as that of the plaintiff, but
declined to apply that law retroactively to the plaintiff’s case, given that
Rodrigue was decided after the events in question.68 The plaintiff’s injury
occurred more than one year before Rodrigue, and the lawsuit was
instituted more than one year before Rodrigue,69 but more than one year
after the plaintiff’s injury.
Distilling prior case law, the Court found three factors bearing on the
nonretroactive application of judicial decisions: (1) whether the
subsequent decision changed the law in an unforeseeable manner; (2) the
purpose and history of the rule in question; and (3) whether retroactive
application would create inequity, injustice, or hardship.70 Applying
these factors, the Court found that Rodrigue should not be applied
retroactively to time bar the plaintiff’s case because (1) Rodrigue
unforeseeably overruled the applicable Fifth Circuit case law upon which
the plaintiff could have reasonably relied; (2) a purpose of the Lands Act
“was to aid injured employees,” but terminating the plaintiff’s lawsuit as
time barred would deprive him of any remedy and “would surely be
inimical to the beneficent purpose of the Congress”; and thus (3) would
“produce the most ‘substantial inequitable results,’” stripping the
plaintiff’s day in court and potential redress based on a time limitation
that he could not have known the law imposed on him.71 Accordingly,
the Court declined to “indulge in the fiction that the law now announced
has always been the law.”72
Chevron Oil thus allows for civil judgments in federal courts to be
made prospective only in operation and provides a test for when this is
appropriate. Subsequent cases, however, have walked back Chevron
67. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 365–66 (1969).
68. See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 100 (affirming judgment but noting that Rodrigue should not
be applied retroactively to this case).
69. Id. at 105.
70. Id. at 106–07 (citing Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)); see also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S.
86, 113–14 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing generally the factors to be considered in
non-retroactive application of judicial decisions).
71. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107–08.
72. Id. at 107 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment)).
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Oil’s allowance of prospective judicial decision-making and discouraged
its use, such that although it most likely remains an option, it is rarely
used.73
2. James B. Beam
Two decades after Chevron Oil, in James B. Beam Distilling Co.,74 the
Court reconsidered Chevron Oil and its allowance of prospective-only (or
nonretroactive) application of judicial decisions, clarifying some limits
on prospectivity. Prior to its 1985 amendment, Georgia state law taxed
imports of alcohol products at a rate double that for homegrown
products.75 In 1984, the Court held in Bacchus that a Hawaii state statute
that similarly distinguished between imported and local alcohol products
violated the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause.76 The plaintiff,
a Kentucky bourbon manufacturer, claimed that Georgia’s law was
likewise invalid under the Commerce Clause, and sought a refund of
taxes paid from 1982–84.77
The case made its way to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which agreed
that the Georgia tax statute was invalid prospectively in light of Bacchus,
but refused to apply its ruling retroactively, so it declined to declare the
state’s application of the statute unconstitutional for the years in
question.78 In other words, the court held that Georgia could not continue
to discriminate between imported and local alcohol products going
forward, but that it could keep the taxes already collected.
The Georgia court used the Chevron Oil test, finding (1) the change in
law was unforeseeable, at least up until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984
Bacchus decision, given that the Georgia tax statute had been in effect
since 1938 and had withstood a Commerce Clause challenge in the
Georgia Supreme Court in 1939; (2) the second factor was not applicable
because the discriminatory aspect of the Georgia tax statute at issue was
repealed in 1985; and (3) retroactive application of the ruling could result
in a windfall to alcohol producers, while Georgia would face “liability for
over 30 million dollars in refunds for taxes it collected in good faith under
73. See, e.g., Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Jolly, No. 07-13143, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150634, at *4
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (“While prospective application of a ruling is rare, it is permissible.”); Mauget
v. Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (“The instances where noncriminal
and nonconstitutional decisions are applied prospectively only are extremely rare.”); Michael P.
Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law or
Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 608 (2001) (“[P]rospective judicial decisions are
rare.”); Lonny Hoffman, Pereira’s Aftershocks, 61 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2019).
74. See generally James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
75. Id. at 532.
76. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
77. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 533.
78. See id. (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State, 382 S.E.2d 95, 96 (Ga. 1989)).
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an unchallenged and presumptively valid statute.”79 Balancing these
factors, the Georgia court declined to declare the tax statute void ab initio,
concluding instead that “prospective application of the decision is
appropriate,” such that the state could keep the taxes previously collected
under the prospectively invalid statute.80
In a fractured decision with five different opinions, none of which
garnered a majority, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.81 Justice Souter
announced the judgment of the Court, delivering an opinion joined by
Justice Stevens.82 The opinion is essentially a treatise on retroactivity and
is worth discussing in detail; it observed that retroactivity could be
viewed as a choice-of-law question pitting the “old” representation of law
against the “new,” to be answered in one of three ways: (1) full
retroactivity, (2) pure prospectivity, or (3) selective prospectivity.83
Justice Souter explained that full retroactivity is the default in that
judicial decisions are normally made fully retroactive, “applying both to
the parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims
may be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such
as statutes of limitations,” and that this practice of retroactivity “reflects
the declaratory theory of law,” under which “courts are understood only
to find the law, not to make it.”84 However, the standard practice of
retroactivity may sometimes create practical difficulties and could be
criticized for failing “to take account of reliance on cases subsequently
abandoned, a fact of life if not always one of jurisprudential
recognition.”85
In light of these difficulties, the Court “has, albeit infrequently,
resorted to pure prospectivity,” under which the “case is decided under
the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with
respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision.”86 This
technique of pure prospectivity could be justified where “to apply the new
rule to parties who relied on the old would offend basic notions of justice
and fairness.”87 However, Justice Souter noted that it could tend to
weaken stare decisis, stating, “this equitable method has its own
drawback: it tends to relax the force of precedent, by minimizing the costs
79. James B. Beam, 382 S.E.2d at 97.
80. Id.
81. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 532.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 535–38.
84. Id. at 535–36.
85. Id. at 536.
86. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536 (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 142–43 (1976); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 422 (1964)).
87. Id. at 536–67 (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 554–55 (1982)).
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of overruling, and thereby allows the courts to act with a freedom
comparable to that of legislatures.”88
The third possibility, known as modified or selective prospectivity, is
that “a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced,
then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts
predating the pronouncement.”89 This approach was developed in the
criminal context, in cases where full retroactivity would have required
retrial or releases of numerous prisoners found guilty by “trustworthy
evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional
standards,” but where “without retroactivity at least to the first successful
litigant, the incentive to seek review would be diluted if not lost
altogether.”90 However, selective prospectivity’s major drawback is that
it “breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations should be
treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule
of law generally.”91 In light of this drawback, the Court had a few years
earlier abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity in the criminal
context in Griffith, in favor of full retroactivity.92
In James B. Beam, the Souter opinion then extended Griffith’s
abandonment of selective prospectivity to the civil context.93 The opinion
reasoned that selective prospectivity’s advantage of preserving incentives
to seek review was weaker in the civil context, where even without
retroactive application to their own facts, repeat litigants might still
receive forward-looking benefits from working a change in the law.94
Having removed the possibility of selective prospectivity, the opinion
then found that since full retroactivity was applied in Bacchus itself—the
decision that “changed” the law by holding that discriminatory taxation
for alcohol imports violates the Commerce Clause—pure prospectivity of
the Bacchus change in law was no longer on the table. Thus, Bacchus also
had to be applied retroactively to the matter before the Court in James B.
Beam, under “principles of equality and stare decisis.”95
Having decided in favor of full retroactivity on the choice-of-law issue,
the Souter opinion in James B. Beam then drew out an important
distinction between the choice-of-law issue and remedial issues. The
opinion explained that even once a rule is found to apply backward,
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 536–67 (citing Johnson, 457 U.S. at 554–55).
Id. at 537.
Id. (citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966)).
James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 537 (citing RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION 69–72 (1961)).
92. Id. at 538 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).
93. Id. at 540.
94. Id. at 540–41.
95. Id. at 540.
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“there may then be a further issue of remedies,” which can be governed
by state law, at least where the case originates in state court.96 With
respect to choice-of-law, the opinion observed that “the rejection of
modified [or selective] prospectivity precludes retroactive application of
a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others,” such that
“the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on
the equities of the particular case.”97 Justice Souter further clarified that
it “is simply in the nature of precedent,” that “the substantive law will not
shift and spring on such a basis.”98
But with respect to remedies, the opinion did not preclude
consideration of individual equities, stating, “nothing we say here
precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial
issues in particular cases.”99 Although the Court held that Bacchus had to
be applied retroactively as a matter of choice-of-law, it made clear that
the respondents were not precluded on remand from attempting to
“demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining
the nature of the remedy.”100 Indeed, on remand in James B. Beam, the
Supreme Court of Georgia declined to grant a tax refund, in part because
of the taxpayer’s “failure to avail itself of the predeprivation remedies
available to it prior to payment of the disputed taxes.”101
Although it was clear in its view that selective or modified
prospectivity is not a viable option, Justice Souter’s opinion in James B.
Beam did “not speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure
prospectivity.”102 However, Justice White did so in his opinion
concurring in the judgment, making clear his view that, under Chevron
Oil, pure prospectivity was still an option in appropriate cases.103
On the other hand, Justices Blackmun and Scalia both concurred in the
judgment and argued that pure prospectivity was never appropriate, such
that full retroactivity was, in their view, always the only viable option.
Both viewed pure prospectivity as contrary to Article III’s case or
controversy requirement, in that if a case requires a court to announce a
new rule, the court must “do so in the context of the case and apply it to
the parties who brought” the case.104 To announce a new rule but apply
96. Id. at 535 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 210 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
97. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 543.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 543–44.
100. Id. at 544.
101. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State, 263 Ga. 609, 614–15 (1993).
102. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 535–44.
103. Id. at 545–46 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 549 (Scalia, J.,
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it only prospectively, in their view, would be acting too much like a
legislature, and thus contrary to separation of powers.105 One might
similarly say that a purely prospective change in the law would be an
impermissible “advisory opinion” if it does not even apply to the parties
before the court.106 Relatedly, any purely prospective statement of what
the law will be, not applied to the parties before the court, could fairly be
called dictum in that it would not be on the path of reasoning that led to
the judgment.107 Pure prospectivity was also again said to weaken stare
decisis by “eliminating the tension between the current controversy and
the new rule,” allowing courts to “dodge the stare decisis bullet by
avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us
from disturbing our settled precedents.”108
Finally, Justice O’Connor dissented, arguing that under a proper
Chevron Oil analysis, the Bacchus rule should be applied only
prospectively, essentially agreeing with the Georgia Supreme Court’s
analysis on this score.109 Justice O’Connor also took issue with the
assertion that retroactivity furthers stare decisis, arguing instead that pure
prospectivity is more in accord with stare decisis, in that “[b]y not
applying a law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the
settled expectations that have built up around the old law.”110
Both sides of the debate around retroactivity and stare decisis have
some merit. Justice O’Connor is correct in a micro sense that pure
prospectivity better respects justified reliance on the old law—reliance
being a core value underlying stare decisis.111 But Justices Blackmun and
Scalia are also correct that in a macro sense, courts may be less likely to
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that in his view “the judicial Power of the United States,”
as conferred in Article III, must be understood as the power “‘to say what the law is’ . . . not the
power to change it.”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
105. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Unlike a
legislature, we do not promulgate new rules to be applied prospectively only . . . .”).
106. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“[T]he oldest and most consistent thread in
the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.” (quoting
CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1963)).
107. See Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661, 663 (2017)
(citing Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 961 (2005);
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997, 2007 (1994)) (explaining that
judicial statements that are not part of the path of reasoning that led to the judgment in the case
before the court are a form of pure dicta known as an “aside”).
108. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 548; see also id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that while overruling prior precedent may present difficulties, those difficulties provide
“checks upon judicial lawmaking”).
109. Id. at 552 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 551–52 (“At its core, stare decisis allows those affected by the law to order their
affairs without fear that the established law upon which they rely will suddenly be pulled out from
under them.”).
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change the law in the first place when they are required to face the
potentially disruptive consequences of full retroactivity.112
3. Harper
The debate continued just two years later, in Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation, which presents the Court’s most recent
definitive statement of the current law on retroactivity.113 Another
taxation case, Harper involved the retroactive application of Davis,114
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for a state
to tax retirement benefits paid by the federal government while
exempting retirement benefits paid by the state.115 The Court in Davis
applied this rule to the parties before it, holding that “federal retirees were
entitled to a refund of taxes” paid pursuant to the invalid state tax
scheme.116 However, in Harper, applying Chevron Oil, the Supreme
Court of Virginia refused to apply Davis retroactively.117 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding when the Court applies a rule of federal
law to the parties before it, this “requires every court to give retroactive
effect to that decision.”118
The Court thus reaffirmed and endorsed the complete rejection of the
possibility of selective or modified prospectivity as stated in Justice
Souter’s James B. Beam opinion.119 Stated differently: “When this Court
applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the
controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive
effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement
of the rule.”120 The first clause of this sentence further clarifies the
Court’s rejection of selective prospectivity; once the new rule has
retroactively applied to one party, it must be so applied in all open cases.
The reference to direct review carves out an exception for collateral

112. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Because it forces us to consider
the disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines with stare decisis to
prevent us from altering the law each time the opportunity presents itself.”).
113. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
114. Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
115. Harper, 509 U.S. at 89.
116. Id. at 90 (quoting Davis, 489 U.S. at 817).
117. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 241 Va. 232, 243 (1991).
118. Harper, 509 U.S. at 90.
119. Id. at 97 (“This rule extends Griffith’s ban against ‘selective application of new rules.’ . . .
we now prohibit the erection of selective temporal barriers to the application of federal law in noncriminal cases.”) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
120. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
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review, such as habeas corpus,121 in the criminal context.122 The
reference to “cases still open” reflects the principle that finality will take
precedence over retroactivity, so as to maintain legal stability.123
The Court held that Chevron Oil was inapplicable because the case
announcing the “new” rule, Davis, had already itself applied the rule
retroactively to the parties before it, thus taking pure prospectivity off the
table for that rule.124 Although Davis did not discuss retroactivity, full
retroactivity is assumed as a default unless the court states otherwise,125
and the Court in Davis did state: “to the extent appellant has paid taxes
pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is entitled to a refund,”126 which
according to the Court in Harper “constituted a retroactive application of
the rule announced in Davis to the parties before the Court.”127 Since
Davis had retroactively applied its holding to the Michigan parties before
it, the Supreme Court of Virginia was similarly required to apply Davis
retroactively.128
As in James B. Beam, the Harper Court left the issue of the remedy,
that is, whether a tax refund should in fact be granted, for the state courts
to address on remand, but noted that “the Constitution requires Virginia
‘to provide relief consistent with federal due process principles.’”129 The
Court explained: “State law may provide relief beyond the demands of
federal due process . . . but under no circumstances may it confine
petitioners to a lesser remedy.”130 Whether a refund was necessary to
comply with federal due process was said to turn on whether Virginia
121. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (“[N]ew rules will
not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas corpus.”) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989)).
122. See James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 540 (“No such difficulty exists in the civil arena, in which
there is little opportunity for collateral attack of final judgments.”).
123. See id. at 541 (“[R]etroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need for finality.”);
see also Quantum Res. Mgmt., LLC v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 112 So.3d 209, 217 (La. 2013) (“A
contrary rule would produce chaos in the legal system, as judgments could be continually opened
and reopened with every fluctuation in the law.”); Hoffman, supra note 73, at 47–48 (“[T]he general
rule against retroactivity for fully closed cases is quite clear, both as to criminal and civil cases.”).
124. Harper, 509 U.S. at 98.
125. See id. at 97–98 (stating that the Court’s announcement of a rule of federal law is
understood to have followed the rule of retroactive application, thereby applying to the litigants
before the Court) (quoting James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 539).
126. Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989).
127. Harper, 509 U.S. at 98. On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia did grant the taxpayer
refunds, because it had previously interpreted the state’s tax statute as requiring a refund of taxes
illegally collected. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 250 Va. 184, 192 (1995) (“[W]e now adopt,
for the first time, the Department’s view that a refund is discretionary . . . .”).
128. Harper, 509 U.S. at 99.
129. Id. at 100 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181 (1990) (plurality
opinion)).
130. Id. at 102 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18 (1990)) (noting that the relief must satisfy federal minimum requirements).
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provided an adequate form of predeprivation process, for example by
authorizing taxpayers to bring suit to enjoin imposition of a tax.131
Although some have debated this point, most circuit courts and
commentators that have addressed the issue have found, probably
correctly, that the Court in Harper did not overrule Chevron Oil; it just
held that Chevron Oil cannot apply to thwart retroactivity where the
decision announcing a new interpretation of the law has already been
applied retroactively; as to do so would be akin to selective prospectivity,
which has been rejected.132 The Court in Harper thus did not preclude
the possibility of applying Chevron Oil in a decision first announcing a
new interpretation (which in this situation would have been Davis), to
make that interpretation purely prospective.133
However, Justice Scalia concurred in Harper, arguing that Chevron
Oil should be completely abandoned in favor of absolute full
retroactivity.134 He argued that Chevron Oil could not lead to consistent
results, pointing for example to the variance in Harper itself between
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in part, which would have applied the
Chevron Oil test but still made Davis retroactive, and Justice O’Connor’s
dissent, which would have applied Chevron Oil to make Davis
prospective, as in their view Davis had left open the question of
prospectivity versus retroactivity.135
Justice Scalia also argued that there was no justification for treating
retroactivity differently in the civil context as compared with the criminal
context, where prospectivity had already been rejected. For a time,
131. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 101–02 (noting that an alternate constitutionally sufficient remedy
would allow taxpayers to withhold payment and then object in a tax enforcement proceeding).
132. See Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 501 F.3d 323, 337−38 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining
that a new interpretation of federal law is controlling retroactively to all cases that are open on
direct review at the time the rule is announced); Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 690 (9th
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] court announcing a new rule of law must decide between pure
prospectivity and full retroactivity . . . .”); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106−07 (1971)) (explaining that in civil cases there is a
narrow equitable exception to the general rule that judicial decisions are retroactive); 1 LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-3, at 226 (3d ed. 2000); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 134.06 (3d ed. 1997) (“In a civil case, therefore, a
court announcing a new rule has only two choices: pure prospectivity or full retroactivity.”); cf.
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET. AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 76 (5th ed. 2003) (noting that much of Harper’s reasoning “raises doubts that the Court
would regard purely prospective adjudication as legitimate.”).
133. Harper, 509 U.S. at 114–15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[S]ix Justices in James B. Beam,
supra, expressed their disagreement with selective prospectivity . . . . But no decision of this Court
forecloses the possibility of pure prospectivity . . . .”).
134. Id. at 102–03 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 103; see also id. at 118 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court in Davis
“preserved the retroactivity question for another day.”); Id. at 110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
(arguing that Chevron Oil governs retroactivity in civil cases and that the principles for retroactivity
in criminal cases should not be applied in civil cases).
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criminal law did allow for prospectivity, beginning with Linkletter,136 but
that case was overruled in Griffith, which according to Justice Scalia
“returned this Court, in criminal cases, to the traditional view” that
prospective decision-making “violates basic norms of constitutional
adjudication” and the nature of judicial review.137 Thus, to bring civil
retroactivity doctrine in line with criminal, Justice Scalia would have
overruled Chevron Oil and abandoned any possibility of prospective
judicial decision-making.
Justice O’Connor dissented, lamenting that “the Court applies a new
rule of retroactivity to impose crushing and unnecessary liability on the
States, precisely at a time when they can least afford it.”138 While
agreeing that the possibility of selective prospectivity has been
foreclosed, the dissent also wrote to clarify that if and to the extent that
the majority opinion “intimates that pure prospectivity may be
prohibited,” that “intimation is incorrect,” and that in any event, “the
question of pure prospectivity is not implicated here,” so any such
intimation would not only be dictum, but “dictum that is contrary to clear
precedent.”139 Justice O’Connor also elaborated on the difference
between the choice-of-law retroactivity question, and the question of
remedy. With respect to the remedy, the “issue is not whether to apply
new law or old law, but what relief should be afforded once the prevailing
party has been determined under applicable law.”140
Although the Court in James B. Beam had made clear that the choiceof-law question could not turn the individual equities of a case,141 Justice
O’Connor clarified that equitable considerations, such as actual reliance
on the prior representation of the law, could in her view “be taken into
account in determining the appropriate remedy,”142 and that

136. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965) (declining to give full retroactive effect to
the Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
137. Harper, 509 U.S. at 104 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
314, 322 (1987)).
138. Harper, 509 U.S. at 113 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[N[othing in the Constitution or
statute requires us to adopt the retroactivity rule the majority now applies.”).
139. Id. at 115–16 (citing five cases where the Court has applied pure prospectivity).
140. Id. at 132 (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991),
superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1) (noting additionally that state law governs determining
which remedies are available).
141. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 543 (adding that any judicial system that promotes fairness
and equality would not allow the “substantive law [. . .to] shift and spring on such a basis.”).
142. Harper, 509 U.S. at 133 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (“To the extent that equitable
considerations, for example, ‘reliance,’ are relevant, I would take this into account in the
determination of what relief is appropriate in any given case.”).
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“commentators appear to be in accord.”143 Thus, according to Justice
O’Connor, even where retroactivity is required as a matter of choice-oflaw, “state and federal courts still retain the ability to exercise their
‘equitable discretion’ in formulating appropriate relief on a federal
claim.”144 The Chevron Oil factors could potentially be used in
determining the appropriate relief; indeed, according to Justice Stevens,
although those factors may have been understood as dealing with choiceof-law, they were always really about the remedy.145
4. Reynoldsville
Two years later in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,146 the Court cast
some doubt on the robustness of the choice-of-law versus remedy
distinction.147 Previously in Bendix,148 the Court had held
unconstitutional (as impermissibly burdening interstate commerce) an
Ohio statute that tolled the statute of limitations so as to effectively give
Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state, but not in-state,
defendants.149 The tort plaintiff in Reynoldsville, Hyde, argued that
Bendix should not apply retroactively to bar her suit because she had
relied on the statute in waiting to sue the out-of-state defendant, and the
Ohio Supreme Court agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding the

143. Id. (“[U]rging consideration of novelty and hardship as part of the remedial framework
rather than as a question of whether to apply old law or new.”) (citing Richard H. Fallon & Daniel
J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731
(1991)); see also Mishkin, supra note 32, at 66–67 n.39 (noting that factors, such as whether the
defendant actually relied on an earlier of holding of the court have been given inadequate attention
as potential alternatives in prospective limitations).
144. Harper, 509 U.S. at 134 (commenting that otherwise permitting federal courts to determine
the remedy by relying on Chevron Oil and not allowing state courts to consider the equities would
“turn federalism on its head”.).
145. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 219–20 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(taking the view that close “examination of Chevron Oil and its progeny reveals that those cases
establish a remedial principle for the exercise of equitable discretion by federal courts and not, as
the plurality states, a choice-of-law principle applicable to all cases on direct review”.); Harper,
509 U.S. at 134 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acquiescing, possibly, to this view and noting that
Justice Stevens’ interpretation seems to have prevailed); Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1767 (1991)
(“A related reason for placing new law issues within the law of remedies is that this approach
succeeds far better than any competitor in avoiding anomalies and self-contradiction.”).
146. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
147. See Fisch, supra note 24, at 1083–84 (citing Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 754) (“The
Court . . . has recently expressed skepticism about whether the distinction between retroactivity and
remedy is anything more than semantic.”).
148. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 891−92 (1988).
149. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 751; see also id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15(A)
(West 1991) (“[T]olling the statute of limitations while a person against whom ‘a cause of action
accrues’ is ‘out of’ or ‘departs from’ the State”)).
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plaintiff’s suit time barred.150
As discussed above, the Court in Harper and James B. Beam clearly
rejected at least selective prospectivity, at least as a matter of choice-oflaw. In light of those cases, it was conceded by Hyde that as a matter of
choice-of-law, Bendix had to apply retroactively to Hyde’s case.151
However, Hyde argued that as a matter of the remedy, her suit should not
be barred, given that states “have a degree of legal leeway in fashioning
remedies for constitutional ills.”152 Pointing to Justice Stevens’s dissent
in American Trucking, and Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Harper, Hyde
argued that Chevron Oil could be recharacterized as a case about
remedies rather than choice-of-law,153 and that, as Justice Harlan had
earlier surmised, “‘equitable considerations’ such as ‘reliance’ might
prove relevant to ‘relief’” in retroactivity situations.154 Thus, Hyde
sought to characterize the Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to dismiss her
suit “as if it were simply an effort to fashion a remedy that takes into
consideration her reliance on pre-Bendix law[].”155
The Court rejected Hyde’s argument. Hyde’s argument that she relied
on the prior representation of the law, the Court found, “is the very sort
that this Court, in Harper, found insufficient to deny retroactive
application of a new legal rule (that had been applied in the case that first
announced it).”156 Thus, Hyde offered “no more than simple reliance”
and “no special reason” for claiming an exception to Harper’s general
rule of retroactivity.157
This squares with Justice Souter’s statement in James B. Beam that the
150. See id. at 750–52. The plaintiff, Carol Hyde, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in
1984, but waited until 1987 to bring her tort claim against the truck driver and company. If the
defendants had been based in Ohio, the statute of limitations would have been only two years, so
the plaintiff’s claim would have been too late, but since the defendants were from Pennsylvania, an
Ohio statute tolled the statute of limitations, making the plaintiff’s lawsuit timely under that statute.
Then in 1988, while the plaintiff’s suit was ongoing, the Supreme Court struck down the tolling
provision as unconstitutional, in Bendix, making the two year statute of limitations for in-state
defendants applicable to out-of-of state defendants as well. The Ohio trial court then dismissed
Hyde’s case as barred by the two-year statute of limitations, but the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated
the suit, holding that under the Ohio Constitution, “Bendix . . . may not be retroactively applied to
bar claims in state courts which had accrued prior to the announcement of that decision.”
151. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 752.
152. Id. (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)) (noting, however, that in
Chevron Oil, the court applied its ruling regarding the statute of limitations on certain torts
prospectively only).
153. Id. at 752–53 (first citing Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 133–34 (O’Conner,
J., dissenting); then citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 218–25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
154. Id. at 753 (quoting United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
155. Id. at 753.
156. Id. at 753–54.
157. Id. at 759.
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choice-of-law retroactivity could not turn on actual reliance, given the
Court’s rejection of selective prospectivity and the principle that it is “the
nature of precedent . . . that the substantive law will not shift and spring
on such a basis.”158 In other words, similarly situated plaintiffs must be
governed by the same law, though that law may allow for differentiation
in the remedy based on equitable factors.
The Court in Reynoldsville seemed concerned that this choice-of-law
principle would be swallowed or rendered ineffectual if reliance alone
could prevent the effects of retroactivity as a matter of remedial
discretion.159 But nothing in the Court’s decision in Reynoldsville clearly
or entirely eviscerated the remedies versus choice-of-law distinction; it is
instead best read as urging caution in employing the distinction lest a
mere relabeling as “remedial discretion” eviscerate foundational choiceof-law retroactivity principles.
The Court noted, furthermore, that Hyde’s requested remedy would
not cure the unconstitutionality of the tolling statute, because allowing
Hyde (and other pre-Bendix cases) to proceed would be akin to
continuing to treat out-of-state defendants differently from in-state
defendants, and thus continuing to violate the Commerce Clause.160 In
other words, Hyde’s tort claim “critically depends upon Ohio tolling law
that continues to violate the Commerce Clause.”161 The Court here seems
to reflect that a waiver of the new more stringent statute of limitations
period does not naturally seem to fall into the category of remedial, or a
“remedy.”162
Justice Scalia concurred, casting doubt on whether “the case in fact
presents any issue of remedies or of remedial discretion at all”; in his
view, a court cannot give a “remedy” for an unconstitutional statute, as
158. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991), superseded by statute,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1.
159. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753 (1995) (explaining that reliance
upon a prior law is “insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule . . . .”); id. at
754 (commenting that for Harper to hold more than mere symbolic effect, mere reliance is
insufficient to “permit a virtually identical denial simply because it is characterized as a denial
based on ‘remedy’ rather than ‘non-retroactivity’.”).
160. Id. at 756.
161. Id.; see also id. at 757 (explaining that Hyde is unable to claim the protection of a separate
and independent state law that would have allowed her claim to proceed; rather, her cause of action
was dependent on an unconstitutional tolling principle).
162. Id. at 756 (“[T]he Ohio Supreme Court’s ‘remedy’ here (allowing Hyde to proceed) does
not cure the tolling statute’s problem of unconstitutionality.”); but see id. at 761 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing that, generally, reliance interests give rise to special considerations for
remedies in two pre-delineated classes of cases: qualified immunity in which an officer relied on
clearly established law, and cases in which a State relied on a law that existed when a conviction
became final. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy describes that reliance on statutes of limitations may
form a third class of cases where the importance of reliance interests that are disturbed precludes
remedies.).
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that “is not in itself a cognizable ‘wrong,’” reasoning that “if it were,
every citizen would have standing to challenge every law.”163 Rather,
“what a court does with regard to an unconstitutional law is simply to
ignore it,” that is, decide the case disregarding the unconstitutional
law.164 Under this view, “if a plaintiff seeks the return of money taken by
the government in reliance on an unconstitutional tax law, the court
ignores the tax law, finds the taking of the property therefore wrongful,
and provides a remedy.”165 But in this case, ignoring the unconstitutional
tolling statute simply resulted in the conclusion that the remedy the
plaintiff sought could not be provided.166
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice O’Connor) concurred in the
judgment, clarifying: “We do not read today’s opinion to surrender in
advance our authority to decide that in some exceptional cases, courts
may shape relief in light of disruption of important reliance interests or
the unfairness caused by unexpected judicial decisions.”167 In their view,
no such unfairness was present in this case, because Bendix did not work
an unforeseeable change in the law or come “out of the blue,” rather, it
was an application of “well-settled constitutional principles.”168
After the chipping away at prospectivity done by James B. Beam,
Harper, and Reynoldsville, it is not clear that much is left of Chevron
Oil.169 But at least, none of these cases clearly preclude pure
prospectivity in a case first announcing an unforeseen change in the law,
where the other Chevron Oil factors are met.170 And perhaps more
importantly, none prohibit the consideration of a case’s equities,
including reliance interests, in exercising a degree of remedial discretion
with respect to retroactivity.

163. Id. at 759–60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 760 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803)).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 760 (“[S]ince it was unconstitutional it ‘was . . . as inoperative as if it had never
been passed . . . .’”) (quoting Chi., Indianapolis & Louisville Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566
(1913)).
167. Id. at 761 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 762–64.
169. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184−85 (1995) (“[W]hatever the continuing
validity of Chevron Oil after [Harper] and [Reynoldsville], there is not the sort of grave disruption
or inequity involved in awarding retrospective relief to this petitioner that would bring that doctrine
into play.”).
170. See Beswick, supra note 14, at 297 (“The Court left room for ‘pure’ prospective
overruling—wherein the Court would deny retroactive relief even to the party who brings the novel
claim—but the current Roberts Court majority does not seem inclined toward it.”); cf. id. at 314
(“Despite its seeming demise before the Rehnquist Court, Chevron Oil–style balancing continues
implicitly to inform judicial reasoning today.”).
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C. Retroactivity and the Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution
provides that “Officers of the United States,” shall be appointed by the
president, except that Congress may choose to vest the appointment of
“inferior officers” in “the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”171 Officers of the United States other than inferior officers
are referred to as “principal” officers.172 An officer that can be fired (or
removed) “at will” is more likely to be considered an inferior officer, as
compared to one with “for cause” type removal protections, who is more
likely to be considered a principal officer, though the removability is only
one factor in assessing the distinction.173 Removal restrictions (or
protections) mean that the officer is removable only “for cause,” such as
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”174 Thus
“removal restrictions” are restrictions on the ability of the president (or
the heads of departments in the chain of command) to remove an officer,
so that the removal restrictions protect or favor the officer or enhance the
officer’s job security to some degree.175
The Appointments Clause is meant to ensure that officers in positions
of significant authority are sufficiently accountable to the public through
the president, “encouraging good appointments and giving the public
someone to blame for bad ones.”176 The Court has observed that the
171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”) (emphases added).
172. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 n.3 (2018) (explaining, for example, that
Administrative Law Judges of the SEC are viewed as inferior officers).
173. See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex 141 U.S. 549 (2020) (noting that the Court has
considered a few factors in distinguishing between principal and inferior officers including: 1. the
official’s power to review and reverse an officer’s decisions, 2. the level of supervision over the
officer, and 3. the official’s power to remove the officer) (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.
651, 664−65 (1997)); Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663–65 (defining “inferior officers” as those who are
directed and supervised by “others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice
and consent of the Senate.”).
174. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619, 626 (1935) (finding that a statute
which states that “any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office” is a restriction on the President’s removal powers).
175. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts: “the inefficiency, malfeasance,
whatever . . . wouldn’t the normal principles of constitutional avoidance suggest that we might
want to scrutinize a little bit how rigorous a limitation that is before we get to the point of striking
down the statute?”).
176. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 455
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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“principle of separation of powers is embedded in the Appointments
Clause,” as it concerns the extent to which Congress may vest
appointments in officers other than the president.177
Complicated retroactivity questions can and do arise when a court
finds that administrative officers such as administrative judges have not
been appointed properly in accordance with the Appointments Clause, or
that the agency’s structure similarly violates separation of powers in
another way. Such a finding raises questions of whether the past actions
of the administrative judges, or at least actions that have not yet become
final after appeal to the judiciary, remain valid.
Although the law applying to this situation is not entirely clear, settled,
or consistent, a reasonable pattern emerges from Court precedent
discussed below. Where the judiciary “fixes” the problem by striking
portions of the statute so as to render the officers at issue more
accountable to the president, it seems that the judicial fix is usually
considered retroactive, such that the past actions of the administrative
officers remain valid, as in Free Enterprise.178 But where the court does
not alter the statute after finding officers improperly appointed, it is up to
the agency itself to fix the problem, and such an agency fix is considered
prospective only, such that past actions of the improperly appointed
officers are open to challenge and reconsideration, as in Ryder and
Lucia.179
This pattern is consistent with the general rule discussed above that,
unlike the judiciary whose pronouncements generally apply retroactively,
executive branch changes in law or policy are generally considered
prospective only.180 Circuit courts have sometimes ruled in accordance
with this pattern, though not always.

177. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882–83 (1991); see also Fin. Oversight & Mgmt.
Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1652 (2020) (“The Appointments Clause
reflects an allocation of responsibility, between President and Senate . . . .”).
178. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513 (2010) (providing
relief that granted increased accountability to the Executive but did not alter past decision by the
Board).
179. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995) (holding that anyone who “makes
a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates
his case” is entitled to relief if there was, in fact, a violation); Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 (applying
and upholding the finding in Ryder and adding that a rehearing must be held by an ALJ who has
not previously heard the case); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014)
(affirming vacatur of NLRB order finding a violation because the Board lacked a quorum due to
the President’s lack of power to make Board recess appointments).
180. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text (discussing judicial fixes being statements
of what the law always was, not a change that will only apply in the future).
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1. Ryder
Less than one month after it decided Reynoldsville, the Court decided
Ryder,181 which dealt with retroactivity in the context of the
Appointments Clause. The petitioner, James Ryder, a member of the U.S.
Coast Guard, was challenging his conviction by a court-martial, which
had been affirmed by the Coast Guard Court of Military Review
(CGCMR), and then by the U.S. Court of Military Appeals (CMA)—both
Article I tribunals.182 Though the CMA agreed with the petitioner that
two of the civilian judges who had heard his case in the CGCMR had not
been appointed properly in accordance with the Appointments Clause, it
nevertheless held that the actions of those judges were valid under the “de
facto officer doctrine.”183 The de facto officer doctrine “confers validity
upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title
even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s
appointment or election to office is deficient.”184 The doctrine stems from
the concern that “chaos . . . would result from multiple and repetitious
suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to
office could be open to question, and seeks to protect the public by
insuring the orderly functioning of the government despite technical
defects in title to office.”185
The Supreme Court held that the administrative judges’ actions in the
case at hand were not valid under the de facto officer doctrine, explaining
that “one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of
the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is entitled to a
decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may be
appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”186 The petitioner’s challenge
was timely because his objection to the judges’ titles was raised “before
those very judges and prior to their action on his case.”187 The Court
reasoned that any “other rule would create a disincentive to raise
Appointments Clause challenges with respect to questionable judicial
appointments.”188
The CMA had relied upon Buckley v. Valeo, where the plaintiffs
successfully challenged the appointment of Federal Election Commission

181. Ryder, 515 U.S. 177.
182. Id. at 179, 179 n.1.
183. Id. at 177.
184. Id. at 180 (citing Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886)).
185. Id. at 180–81 (quoting 63 AM. JUR. 2D, Public Officers and Employees § 578, pp. 1080–
81 (1984)).
186. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182–83.
187. Id. at 182.
188. Id. at 183; see also id. at 186 (“[C]orrecting Appointments Clause violations in cases such
as this one provides a suitable incentive to make such challenges.”).
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members on separation of powers grounds, but the Court nonetheless held
that the past acts of the Commission were “accorded de facto validity.”189
But the Ryder Court distinguished Buckley, noting that it was a civil case
rather than a criminal one, and also that in Buckley the relief the
petitioners sought was awarded to them.190 That is, the Buckley Court
struck down aspects of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and
concluded that “most of the powers conferred by the Act upon the Federal
Election Commission can be exercised only by ‘Officers of the United
States,’ appointed in conformity with [Article II, section 2, clause 2], of
the Constitution, and therefore cannot be exercised by the Commission
as presently constituted.”191 But no retrospective relief with regard to past
acts was requested in Buckley; only forward looking injunctive and
declaratory relief was requested,192 so that is all the Court granted.
The Court’s basis for distinguishing Buckley—that the petitioners
received the relief they sought despite the de facto the validity of the
Commission’s prior actions—seems to square with the Court’s point in
Ryder that granting de facto validity to prior actions might tend to
disincentivize Appointments Clause challenges. In cases where
retrospective relief is not even requested, clearly such relief was not
necessary to incentivize the challenge.
One of the primary arguments in favor of selective prospectivity was
that “without retroactivity at least to the first successful litigant, the
incentive to seek review would be diluted if not lost altogether.”193 But
nevertheless, the Court has rejected selective prospectivity, reasoning
that it violates the principle of treating similarly situated litigants the
same, and that “[i]n the civil context, ‘even a party who is deprived of the
full retroactive benefit of a new decision may receive some relief.’”194
The Court has thus sometimes placed other values over the desire to
189. Id. at 183 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976)). See also Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 142. There is arguably a distinction between granting “de facto validity” as the Court did in
Buckley, and the “de facto officer doctrine.” See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183 (“Neither Buckley nor
Connor explicitly relied on the de facto officer doctrine, though the result reached in each case
validated the past acts of public officials.”) (referring to Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972),
where the Court held that legislative acts performed by legislators held to have been elected in
accordance with an unconstitutional apportionment were not void, and which the Court cited for
support and Buckley); Beske, supra note 7, at 696 n.355 (“[D]e facto validity as used here is distinct
from the ‘de facto officer doctrine . . . .’”). The Court in Ryder seemed to imply that the “de facto
officer” doctrine was inappropriate in the civil Appointments Clause context, see Ryder, 515 U.S.
at 182–84, so this Article will refer instead primarily to “de facto validity” or the “de facto validity
doctrine.”
190. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–84.
191. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
192. Id. at 8–9.
193. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 (1991).
194. Id. at 540–41 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 198–99 (1990).
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incentivize challenges, particularly in the civil context, where regardless,
repeat players likely have incentives to raise structural challenges to
agencies based on the fact that they anticipate continuing to interact with
the agency in the future.
The Court in Ryder also rejected the argument that it was proper for
the CMA to give its decision prospective application only as an exercise
of remedial discretion pursuant to Chevron Oil, on the basis that “there is
not the sort of grave disruption or inequity involved in awarding
retrospective relief to this petitioner that would bring that doctrine into
play,” given that “the defective appointments of the civilian judges affect
only between 7 to 10 cases pending on direct review.”195 The Court here
seems to imply that it has perhaps accepted the view that Chevron Oil
applies to, or at least can apply to, remedies rather than choice-of-law.
The Court also seems to imply here that if the number of pending cases
were greater, such that remanding in each case would be more disruptive,
perhaps remands would not be appropriate in all cases.
The government also argued in Ryder that the CMA applied
“something akin to a harmless-error doctrine in affirming” the conviction,
but the Court declined to address this argument because it had not been
made below.196 The Court elsewhere (in Booker) has subsequently
indicated that appropriate remedies in retroactivity situations may be
subject to principles of harmless error.197 The Court in Ryder held
ultimately that the petitioner was “entitled to a hearing before a properly
appointed panel” at the CGCMR and remanded the case for further
proceedings.198
Ryder and its discussion of Buckley could be read to suggest that in
fashioning relief for an Appointments Clause violation, courts should
balance the degree of disruption that would be caused by not granting de
facto validity to past administrative acts, against the unfairness and harm
to incentives to raise Appointments Clause issues that might be caused if
de facto validity were granted.199 In Ryder, the degree of disruption was
not that great, as only seven to ten cases were affected,200 and the
potential unfairness and harm to incentives were arguably greater because
the context was criminal rather than civil, so de facto validity was not
195. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184–85.
196. Id. at 186.
197. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to
apply ordinary prudential doctrines . . . . whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will
instead be sufficient to review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon application of the
harmless-error doctrine.”).
198. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188.
199. See infra notes 363−364 and accompanying text (discussing the balance between legal
disruption and adjudicative retroactivity).
200. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 185.
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granted. But in Buckley, the degree of disruption likely would have been
far greater if the past actions of the Federal Election Commission were
deemed invalid, and the unfairness and harm to incentives was likely less
since the relief requested was only prospective, so de facto validity was
granted in Buckley.
Another important point though is that in Ryder the fix came from the
executive, so it would be only a prospective fix, thus presumptively
requiring the requested remand with respect to actions previous to the fix.
That is, the Court in Ryder did not do anything to fix the Appointments
Clause violation, such as striking a portion of the relevant statute. Rather,
in Ryder, the Appointments Clause issue had apparently already been
cured prospectively in the executive branch by the Secretary of
Transportation, but this had been done subsequent to the petitioner’s case
being heard by the unduly appointed judges.201 This matters because as
explained above, unlike judicial pronouncements, executive actions such
as a new appointment (or a reappointment) are not generally considered
retroactive.202 But when the fix comes from the judiciary rather than from
the executive branch, the de facto validity doctrine is not necessary
because the officers are already rendered retroactively valid under
foundational principles of retroactivity. The next case provides an
example of this situation.
2. Free Enterprise
The Supreme Court was again faced with retroactivity issues in an
Appointments Clause context in Free Enterprise.203 The case considered
the constitutionality of the Security and Exchange Commission’s Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which had been created by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.204 The Board began a formal investigation
of one of the Free Enterprise Fund’s members, and the Fund then sued
the Board seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board was
unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the Board from exercising
its power prospectively.205
201. See id. at 184 n.4 (“[The government] also contended that subsequent action taken by the
Secretary of Transportation to cure the Appointments Clause error . . .[was a ] relevant criteria.”);
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Ryder, 515 U.S. 177 (No. 94-431) (questioning how the
petitioner was harmed: “The subsequent appointment by the Secretary of Transportation put the
very same people back on the court who made the decision, and it’s hard to construct any kind of
harm to the petitioner here.”); id. at 29–30 (stating that it would be “rather strange” to rely on the
fact that a cure was attempted if no such attempt actually occurred).
202. See supra notes 27–28, and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
executive actions and judicial actions with regards to retroactivity).
203. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
204. Id. at 484; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
205. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
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The Court agreed with the Fund and held “that the dual for-cause
limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the
Constitution’s separation of powers.”206 The Act as originally written had
said that Board members could be removed only for cause, and that the
determination as to whether cause exists would be made not by the
president but rather by “other tenured officers—the Commissioners—
none of whom is subject to the President’s direct control.”207 To cure the
unconstitutionality, the Court severed and struck the statutory sections
that provided for removal restrictions on the Board members, leaving the
Board removable by the Commission at will, such that the president was
“separated from Board members by only a single level of good-cause
tenure.”208 The Court recognized that there may have been other ways of
editing the statute to cure its unconstitutionality, but viewed the excision
of the Board’s removal protections as the least extensive option and thus
the one most appropriate for the judiciary.209 The editorial freedom to
make more extensive changes “belongs to the Legislature, not the
Judiciary,” so Congress remained “free to pursue any of these [more
extensive] options going forward.”210
The Court clarified that, with the tenure restrictions excised, the Act
remained “fully operative as a law.”211 The petitioners (Free Enterprise)
had also argued that the Board members are “principal officers requiring
Presidential appointment with the Senate’s advice and consent,” but the
Court found instead that the “Board members are inferior officers,” given
that the Board’s removal restrictions had been found “unconstitutional
and void,” such that the Commission was “properly viewed, under the
Constitution, as possessing the power to remove Board members at
will.”212
The Court’s language here suggests that it viewed its statutory
excisions as operating retroactively: it did not say that the Board members
were inferior officers “going forward”—language it had just used in
referring to what Congress could do—rather, it said that the Board
members “properly viewed, under the Constitution” were inferior
officers, because the removal protections were “unconstitutional and
void.”213 This seems imply that this was always the proper way to view
206. Id. at 492.
207. Id. at 495.
208. Id. at 509 (severing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), and 7217(d)(3)).
209. Id. at 509–10.
210. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 509 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)).
212. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63
(1997) (“[W]hether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior . . . .”)).
213. Id. at 510; see also id. at 513 (“Petitioners argue that the Framers vested the nomination of
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the Board, in line with foundational retroactivity doctrine and the view
that the proper response to an unconstitutional statutory provision is to
ignore it as though it had never been passed, “because a law repugnant to
the Constitution ‘is void, and is as no law.’”214 The Court was just
clarifying what the law had always been.
This theory is admittedly in some tension with the Court’s
acknowledgment that there may have been other ways to cure the
unconstitutionality. How can one say that the edited statute has always
been the law if one could not have predicted that the Court would choose
this particular way of curing the problem? On the other hand, the Court
did follow the general principle of fixing the problem with the narrowest
or least extensive statutory modification, which perhaps would have
provided some grounds for prediction. In any event, as discussed above,
although the retroactivity doctrine is somewhat formalist—seeming to
imply a single right answer to legal questions that could have been known
all along—and although this is something of a fiction, it is nevertheless a
useful legal fiction.215
The Court went on to reject the petitioners’ remaining arguments that
the Board was unconstitutionally structured, such that they were not
entitled to their requested “broad injunctive relief against the Board’s
continued operations.”216 But the Court stated that the petitioners were
“entitled to declaratory relief sufficient to ensure that . . . standards to
which they are subject will be enforced only by a constitutional agency
accountable to the Executive.”217
It is unclear what if anything the Court had in mind here as far as
declaratory relief beyond the Court’s holding that the Board members’
removal protections were void, but on remand the parties apparently
agreed that the Court’s decision did not require invalidating the Board’s
prior actions.218 Perhaps the Court was just leaving open the possibility
principal officers in the President to avoid the perceived evils of collective appointments, but they
reveal no similar concern with respect to inferior officers, whose appointments may be vested
elsewhere, including in multimember bodies. Practice has also sanctioned the appointment of
inferior officers by multimember agencies.”).
214. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 748, 759–60 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880)).
215. See supra Section I.A. (summarizing foundations and limits of retroactivity).
216. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 513; see also id. at 487 (stating that the petitioners were
seeking “a declaratory judgment that the Board is unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the
Board from exercising its powers.”).
217. Id. at 513 (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 (1986) as “concluding that a
separation-of-powers violation may create a ‘here-and-now’ injury that can be remedied by a
court.”).
218. See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 953 F.3d 760, 779 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Dyk,
J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (citing Judgment, Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Account. Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2011) (ECF No. 66)).
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of some “remedial discretion” on remand, which would be consistent
with the Court’s general retroactivity jurisprudence as discussed
above.219 That is, although the Court seemed to view its statutory
excisions as operating retroactively as a matter of substantive law (or
“choice-of-law”), it left open the possibility that if there were some
“grave disruption or inequity” to these petitioners that had occurred based
on the prior statutory misrepresentation of law, additional remedial action
could have been granted on remand.220
3. Lucia
More recently, in a situation more akin to Ryder than Free Enterprise,
the Supreme Court addressed retroactivity in the Appointments Clause
context again in Lucia.221 The SEC had charged Mr. Lucia with violating
certain securities laws, and in accordance with its typical practice,
assigned an Administrative Law Judge (Cameron Elliot) to adjudicate the
case.222 In an “initial decision” Judge Elliot found that Lucia had violated
the law and imposed sanctions.223 On appeal to the Commission, Lucia
argued Judge Elliot had not been constitutionally appointed under the
Appointments Clause, because ALJs are “Officers of the United States,”
but Judge Elliot had been appointed by an SEC staff member rather than
the president, the courts, or a head of department.224
The Commission rejected Lucia’s argument, as did the DC Circuit,
finding that the ALJs were not “officers” but rather mere employees;
however, the Supreme Court reversed.225 The Court found that the ALJs
were in fact “Officers of the United States”226 because they held “a
continuing office established by law,” and exercise “significant
discretion” in carrying out “important functions.”227
Having found that Judge Elliot’s appointment had not been made in
accordance with the Appointments Clause, the Court then turned to the
issue of remedy.228 Quoting Ryder, the Court stated that it had held that
219. See supra Section I.B. (reviewing recent scholarship on the Appointments clause in a
patent law context).
220. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995) (“But whatever the continuing
validity of Chevron Oil after Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86 (1993), and
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995), there is not the sort of grave disruption or
inequity involved in awarding retrospective relief to this petitioner that would bring that doctrine
into play.”).
221. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).
222. Id. at 2049–50.
223. Id. at 2050.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2050–51.
226. Id. at 2049.
227. Id. at 2053 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)).
228. Id. at 2055.
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“the ‘appropriate’ remedy for an adjudication tainted with an
appointments violation is a new ‘hearing before a properly appointed’
official.”229 The Court also held that on remand, that official could not be
Judge Elliot even if he had by then received a constitutional appointment,
because he “cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had
not adjudicated it before.”230 This was not a major imposition because
other properly appointed ALJs were available to hear the case on remand,
but the Court noted that in other circumstances, a new officer may not be
required.231 Although the Court did not discuss in its opinion how many
other cases would be affected, Lucia’s counsel identified only thirteen
other pending cases in which litigants had preserved objections that could
likewise require rehearing.232
It is important to point out though, that in Lucia as in Ryder the Court
itself did nothing to fix the appointments issue with the administrative
judge. In Lucia, the Court relied on the agency itself to fix the problem,
noting that while the case was on judicial review, the SEC had issued an
order ratifying the prior appointments of its ALJs, though it declined to
address the issue of whether that order was valid.233 This is in contrast to
Free Enterprise, where the Court fixed the issue by striking portions of
the relevant statute so as to make the officers properly appointed.234
Where the judiciary fixes the problem, that fix, like any judicial statement
of the law, is presumptively retroactive. One might say then that where
there is a judicial fix, the prior hearings, properly viewed, were not in fact
“tainted with an appointments violation,” as they were in Ryder in Lucia
where there was no judicial fix.235
Lucia thus squares with the general theory and pattern that judicial
action is at least presumptively retroactive so that past agency actions are
not necessarily invalid when there is a judicial fix, though some
additional relief may be provided in individual cases as a matter of
remedial discretion. But where the judiciary has not fixed the problem,
the past actions of improperly appointed agency actors are generally
subject to reconsideration, at least when requested and unless the court
decides to apply the de facto validity doctrine, which Lucia did not
discuss.

229. Id. (quoting Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183, 188 (1995)).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 2055 n.5 (“[W]e do not hold that a new officer is required for every Appointments
Clause violation.”).
232. See Beske, supra note 7, at 697–98 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 48–49, Lucia, 138 S. Ct.
2044 (No. 17-130)).
233. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 n.6.
234. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509–10 (2010).
235. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
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4. Seila Law
Most recently, in Seila Law, a case more akin to Free Enterprise than
to Ryder and Lucia, the Supreme Court severed removal restrictions to
cure an unconstitutionality.236 Although the Court did not address
retroactivity or the extent to which prior agency actions should be called
into question, the Court’s analysis may nevertheless shed some light on
these questions.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a civil
investigative demand (CID) in 2017 against Seila Law LLC, a law firm
that provides debt-related legal services to clients, to determine whether
the firm had engaged in “unlawful acts or practices in the advertising,
marketing, or sale of debt relief services.”237 The CID directed Seila Law
to produce information and documents related to its business practices,
but Seila Law objected, asking the CFPB to set aside the demand on the
basis that the agency’s leadership by a single director removable only for
cause violated Article II and separation of powers.238 The CFPB declined
to set aside the demand, Seila Law refused to comply, and the CFPB filed
a petition to enforce the demand in the district court, where Seila Law
again argued that the CFPB’s structure violated the Constitution.239
The district court disagreed and ordered Seila Law to comply with the
demand, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court
reversed, agreeing with Seila Law that the CFPB structure violated the
Constitution.240 Although the Court had upheld removal restrictions (or
“tenure protection”) on a single independent counsel in Morrison v.
Olson,241 the Court distinguished that case on the basis that the
independent counsel was an inferior officer under the Appointments
Clause, not a principal officer like the director of the CFPB.242 The Court
reasoned that removal restrictions on the single director of the CFPB gave
too much power in the executive branch to an individual other than the
president, and was thus “incompatible with our constitutional
structure.”243
However, the Court then found that the constitutional problem could
be fixed by striking and severing the director’s removal restrictions, in
part because the relevant act contained a severability clause.244 The Court
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2210–11 (2020).
Id. at 2194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2197, 2202.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988).
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.
Id. at 2201.
Id. at 2209.
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reasoned that the relevant act (the Dodd-Frank Act)245 is capable of
functioning independently without the director’s removal restriction,
such that its provisions “bearing on the CFPB’s structure and duties
remain fully operative without the offending tenure restriction.”246
Although there may have been other ways to remedy this defect, the
Court reiterated that it does not have the power to rewrite statutes, but
merely has “the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional
enactment.”247
Having excised the unconstitutionality, the Court remanded to the
court of appeals “to consider whether the civil investigative demand was
validly ratified.”248 This remand was dictated by the peculiarities of the
case and the way in which it was argued. In an unusual move, the
Government had declined to defend the CFPB structure, yet also had
declined to simply drop the CID, arguing that the demand was
enforceable because “it has since been ratified by an Acting Director
accountable to the President,” though the parties disputed “whether this
alleged ratification in fact occurred and whether, if so, it is legally
sufficient to cure the constitutional defect in the original demand.”249
Because this issue had not been briefed or addressed below, the Court
declined to address it in the first instance.250
Nor did the Court address the extent to which other prior actions of the
CFPB could now be called into question.251 But under the approach of
this Article, and in accord with retroactivity principles (which the Court
also did not address), the Court’s severance of tenure protections should
be viewed as operating retroactively, so there is no need to view the
agency’s prior actions as invalid, though as a matter of discretion courts
might grant appropriate relief in cases where it appears that the prior
representation of the excised removal restrictions were somehow relied
245. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 et seq.
246. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2209.
247. Id. at 2211 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
248. Id. at 2211.
249. Id. at 2208.
250. Id. at 2221, 2208 n.12 (“[W]hether and when the temporary involvement of an
unconstitutionally insulated officer in an otherwise valid prosecution requires dismissal falls
outside the questions presented, has not been fully briefed, and is best resolved by lower courts in
the first instance.”).
251. See Evan Weinberger, High Court Ruling Leaves CFPB Enforcement Actions in Doubt,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 30, 2020, 4:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/highcourt-ruling-leaves-cfpb-enforcement-actions-in-doubt
[https://perma.cc/FN7L-K2MK]
(speculating that if the CFPB’s past actions are not quickly ratified, “companies could run to court
seeking to overturn them on the grounds that the CFPB was unconstitutional at the time the
decisions were made . . . .”); see also id. (“The Supreme Court may have ‘opened Pandora’s Box’
that could allow companies to nullify enforcement actions and even regulations from when the
CFPB was constitutionally defective . . . .”).
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upon or otherwise likely made some actual difference to the outcome.
The Court did not address these issues perhaps in part because the
government conceded that the initial issuance of the CID to Seila Law
was unconstitutional.252
The Court in Seila Law reiterated that traceability requirements are
loosened in the context of Appointments Clause–type challenges to
agency structure. Although the appointed amicus curiae253 had argued
that Seila Law lacked standing to challenge the director’s removal
restriction in light of the fact that it had (allegedly) been ratified by an
acting director without any removal restrictions, the Court rejected this
argument on the basis that “a litigant challenging governmental action as
void on the basis of separation of powers is not required to prove that the
Government’s course of conduct would have been different in a
‘counterfactual world’ in which the Government had acted with
constitutional authority.”254
This loosened traceability requirement is part of what makes
retroactivity issues especially salient in the Appointments Clause and
related separation of powers contexts, because it increases the likelihood
that a constitutional defect that is cured by the court will have had no
likely effect on the merits, such that remand will accordingly be
imprudent as a matter of remedial discretion. It is one thing to say that a
challenger may raise this sort of constitutional issue even where it is has
not made a difference, but it is another to ignore foundational retroactivity
principles while ordering a wasteful and unnecessary rehearing in such a
situation.
Because the Court in Seila Law did not address the extent to which the
CFPB’s past actions are now invalid, lower courts will likely soon be
forced to, and should keep in mind that the Supreme Court’s statutory
excisions must be viewed as operating retroactively under established
law. Unfortunately, certain circuit courts have at times lost sight of this
fundamental principle.
5. Lower Court Decisions
There is some conflict and inconsistency among the circuits regarding
retroactivity in the Appointments Clause context.
252. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (“The Court grounded
its analysis in its assertion that the FTC ‘occupies no place in the executive department
and . . . exercises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.’”)
(quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)).
253. Id. at 2195 (“Because the Government agrees with petitioner on the merits of the
constitutional question, we appointed Paul Clement to defend the judgment below as amicus
curiae.”).
254. Id. at 2196 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 512
n.12 (2010)).
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In Collins v. Mnuchin,255 the en banc Fifth Circuit struck for cause
removal restrictions on agency officials to cure an Appointments Clause
violation and declined to vacate prior actions of the agency. In 2012, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and Treasury adopted an
amendment to their financing agreements, under which Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were to give Treasury “nearly all their net worth each
quarter as a dividend.”256 The plaintiffs, shareholders in Fannie and
Freddie, objected to this amendment on the grounds that the FHFA was
unconstitutionally structured, because it was headed by a single director
removable only “for cause.”257 The en banc Fifth Circuit agreed that this
structure is unconstitutional, but cured the issue by striking the for cause
removal protections from the FHFA’s enabling statute,258 such that the
director was removable at will.259
As for the remedy, a majority of the en banc court held that having
rendered the statute constitutional by severing the for cause removal
restrictions, it was not necessary to undo the prior actions of FHFA that
had been taken while its director was purportedly (based on the laterstricken portions of the statute) not removable at will.260 The court
considered that perhaps in some instances where removal restrictions had
been stricken, past actions should be invalidated, such as where “an
independent officer would act differently than if that officer were
removable at will.”261 But the court concluded that “even if that theory is
right, it does not apply here,” because the president did have plenary
authority to stop the action complained of given that it was overseen by
the Secretary of Treasury, who was subject to removal at will; moreover,
“subsequent Presidents have picked their own FHFA directors, allaying
concerns that the removal restriction prevented them from installing
someone who would carry out their policy vision.”262
As such, the court found that the “only judgment the Shareholders are
entitled to is the one the Supreme Court has given in similar removalrestriction cases [such as Free Enterprise], which is a declaration
removing the ‘for cause’ provision found unconstitutional,” noting that
sending “the case back for further litigation would cast one of the most

255. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct.
193 (2020). The case was argued before the Supreme Court on December 9, 2020.
256. Id. at 562–63.
257. Id. at 563.
258. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) created the FHFA. See Collins,
938 F.3d at 563 (citing Pub. L. No. 110-289, 112 Stat. 2654).
259. Collins, 938 F.3d at 563–92.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 593–94.
262. Id. at 594.
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financially consequential agencies into chaos.”263 Collins is thus
consistent with the general theory of this Article: where the judiciary
fixes an Appointments Clause issue by severing portions of the statute,
the fix at least presumptively applies retroactively such that it is not
necessary to undo prior administrative actions. However, as a matter of
remedial discretion, courts may order that prior actions be undone (or
redone) for example if there is some reason to think that such actions
would not have been taken under a correct understanding of the law,
viewing it without the severed provisions.
But this view of the law is not currently universally understood or
accepted. To begin with, seven of the sixteen judges in Collins explicitly
disagreed with it, in a dissent written by Judge Willett.264 Those judges
thought that the past actions of the unconstitutionally structured FHFA,
including the disputed amendment to the financing agreements, had to be
set aside, and dissented “from the court’s decision to instead grant a
prospective remedy.”265
As an initial point, the reference to a “prospective remedy” here is
confused. Although the majority did not vacate the prior actions of the
FHFA, it did not make its holding prospective only in the Chevron Oil
sense. To the contrary, by striking the unconstitutional statutory removal
protections, and viewing that as retroactively fixing the problem, the
majority avoided the need to vacate the prior actions. In other words, the
majority made both its declaration of unconstitutionality and its fix to that
unconstitutionality retroactive in operation, thus avoiding the need for
vacatur of prior agency actions.
For support, the dissent pointed to Bowsher v. Synar, where the Court
held that Congress had unconstitutionally retained a role in the removal

263. Id. at 595. See also Collins, 938 F.3d at 626 (Costa, J., dissenting in part) (“But if we were
to grant Shareholders that relief based on their separation-of-powers claim, they would be receiving
not just a financial windfall. Unravelling the Net Worth Sweep because of limits on the removal
power that had nothing to do with the creation or continuation of that financial policy would also
be giving Shareholders a constitutional windfall.”). Interestingly, Judge Costa would have gone
further and found that because the alleged injury was not traceable to the alleged constitutional
error (the removal protections), the plaintiffs lacked standing altogether. See id. at 620–21 (“[T]he
Net Worth Sweep is not traceable to the for-cause limitation on the President’s power to remove
the FHFA Director. In deciding whether Congress has violated the separation of powers at the
behest of plaintiffs who lack standing, we violate the separation of powers ourselves.”). But see id.
at 586 (“The Shareholders’ injury is traceable to the removal protection.”) and id. at 624 (Costa, J.,
dissenting in part) (“The Supreme Court has loosened the standing inquiry when it is not possible
to know if the allegedly unconstitutional structure of an agency caused the challenger’s injury.”);
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 512 n.12 (2010) (“[S]tanding does
not require precise proof of what the Board’s policies might have been in that counterfactual
world.”).
264. Collins, 938 F.3d at 626 (Willett, J., dissenting in part).
265. Id. at 626, 629.
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of the Comptroller General, an officer exercising executive power.266 The
Court held that the proper remedy was simply to allow the relevant act’s
fallback provisions to take effect.267 Before any court had ruled on the
constitutional challenge, the president had issued one sequestration order
under the initial procedure, on February 1, 1986, which was to take effect
on March 1, 1986.268 However, the district court ruled on February 7,
1986, that this order was “declared without legal force and effect”
because it was issued “pursuant to the unconstitutional automatic deficit
reduction process,” though this was “without prejudice to implementation
of the alternate deficit reduction process specifically set forth in section
274(f) of the Act to cover the eventuality of the invalidation declared
above.”269 In affirming the district court, the Court did not discuss any
further what was to be done about the improperly issued sequestration
order.270
The Collins dissent viewed Bowsher as requiring the invalidation of
the FHFA amendment.271 Judge Duncan however, concurring with the
majority, viewed Bowsher as “off-point,” observing that the Bowsher
Court concluded that the “issue of remedy” was “a thicket we need not
enter” given that Congress had provided a “fallback” provision.272
Bowsher is not contrary to the general theory of this Article, first
because the Court did not even discuss what was to be done about the
prior sequestration order, but primarily because the sequestration order
had clearly been issued under a procedure that had been declared
unconstitutional; that is, the executive branch actions following that
procedure had been taken in clear reliance on stricken portions of the Act
and could not have been taken in the same manner under the cured Act.
By contrast, in Collins, it was clear that the complained of past action did
266. Id. at 626 (discussing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)); see also Bowsher, 478
U.S. at 720 (“[T]he [District Court] concluded, Congress may not retain the power over an officer
performing executive functions.”) At issue in Bowsher was the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,
designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by setting a “maximum deficit amount” for each
fiscal year from 1986 through 1991, with that amount progressively reducing to zero in 1991. Id.
at 717 (discussing 2 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1982)). The Act required the Directors of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to independently
estimate the amount of the expected deficit for the upcoming fiscal year, calculate the necessary
reductions, and report jointly their estimates to the Comptroller General, who then reviews the
reports and conveys conclusions to the President, who must then issue a “sequestration order”
mandating the spending reductions. Id. at 718 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 251(b)). The Act also contained a
“fallback” deficit reduction process which did not involve the Comptroller General, to take effect
in the event that any of these reporting procedures were invalid. Id. at 718 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 274(f)).
267. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 735–36.
268. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (D.D.C. 1986).
269. Id. at 1404.
270. See generally Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714.
271. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 626 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., dissenting in part).
272. Collins, 938 F.3d at 595–96 (Duncan, J., concurring).
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not depend at all on the stricken removal protections. 273 The fix in
Bowsher was to bring the fallback provisions into effect, and so when this
is applied retroactively, the procedure followed in issuing the prior
sequestration order was contrary to law. Thus, as a matter of remedial
discretion, the Bowsher district court was well within its power to
invalidate the sequestration order, especially given that it had not yet
taken effect, and that this was done without prejudice to later
implementation of the substantially different fallback procedure.
Aside from the dissent in Collins, the DC Circuit in Intercollegiate has
also taken an approach to retroactivity in the Appointments Clause
context that is arguably contrary to the general theory of this Article.274
Intercollegiate Broadcasting was appealing a determination by the
Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) setting the default royalty rates
applicable to internet-based webcasting of digitally recorded music, and
the court agreed with Intercollegiate that the CRJs exercised significant
enough authority that they were principal rather than inferior officers,
such that Congress’s decision to vest their appointment in the Librarian
of Congress rather than the president violated the Appointments
Clause.275
To remedy the issue, the court invalidated and severed the restrictions
on the Librarian’s ability to remove the CRJs, rendering them inferior
officers.276 Then, in the final sentence of its decision, with no citation or
further discussion, the court stated: “Because the Board’s structure was
unconstitutional at the time it issued its determination, we vacate and
remand the determination and do not address Intercollegiate’s arguments
regarding the merits of the rates set therein.”277
It was not necessarily improper for the DC Circuit to vacate and
remand as a matter of remedial discretion, but it was not required to do
so, because the fix—the striking of the statutory removal restrictions—
should have been viewed as operating retroactively, such that the CRJs
were inferior officers at the time they issued the decision. It is not clear
that any other appeals from the CRJs were currently pending, so the
remand was not necessarily disruptive in this particular case, and thus
arguably prudent if viewed as discretionary.
A recent First Circuit case provides an example of a grant of de facto
validity in situations where there is no judicial fix to render the relevant

273. See Collins, 938 F.3d at 625 (Costa, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]here is no doubt that the
alleged constitutional error did not cause the plaintiffs’ injury.”).
274. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.D.C. 2012).
275. Id. at 1337.
276. Id. at 1340–41.
277. Id. at 1342.
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officers retroactively constitutional.278 In Aurelius, the court held that
PROMESA Board Members who had been appointed without Senate
confirmation were principal officers and thus in violation of the
Appointments Clause.279 The court severed a clause from the relevant
statute that authorized the Board Members’ appointment without Senate
confirmation.280 This severance served to prevent any future additional
unconstitutional appointments, but since current Board Members had
already been appointed without Senate confirmation, applying this
judicial severance retroactively would not render the current members
constitutional, as a fix that had rendered them inferior officers would
have.
However, the court nevertheless conferred validity on the prior actions
of the Board Members under the de facto officer doctrine, rather than
“cast a specter of invalidity over all of the Board’s actions until the
present day.”281 The court explained that the doctrine is an “ancient tool
of equity,” and viewed the doctrine as “especially appropriate in this
case,” because invalidating all of the Board’s prior actions would “have
negative consequences for the many, if not thousands, of innocent parties
who have relied on the Board’s actions until now.”282 The court thus held
that its ruling did “not eliminate any otherwise valid actions of the Board
prior to the issuance of our mandate in this case.”283
This grant of de facto validity was reasonable given the high degree of
disruption that would have been caused by not granting it, and the lack of
any apparent manifest unfairness caused by the grant.284 The Supreme
Court reversed and held that the Board Members were not in fact
“Officers of the United States,” so there was no Appointments Clause
problem after all.285 As such, the Court did not need to consider the de
facto officer doctrine.286 But the case illustrates how de facto validity
might be granted as a way of avoiding mass disruption where a court finds
278. Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 861 (1st Cir. 2019).
279. Id. at 861.
280. Id. at 862–63.
281. Id. at 861–62.
282. Id. at 862.
283. Id. Again, there is arguably a distinction between the de facto officer doctrine, and de facto
validity, with the latter being used in Buckley. The First Circuit in Aurelius claimed to be using the
de facto officer doctrine, though it also said: “In so doing, we follow the Supreme Court’s exact
approach in Buckley.” Id. at 862 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976)). The extent to
which there is such a distinction does not much matter for the purposes of this Article, but as noted
above this Article refers primarily to the doctrine of “de facto validity.” See supra note 189.
284. See infra notes 364–365 and accompanying text (discussing how this sort of balancing may
be appropriate under the de facto validity doctrine).
285. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1651–
55 (2020).
286. Id. at 1665.
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an Appointment Clause violation but does not provide a fix to
retroactively render officials properly appointed.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This part will review the relevant literature, beginning with classic
scholarship on retroactivity, and then moving to modern retroactivity
scholarship, focusing particularly on that germane to the Appointments
Clause and to a lesser degree patent law, given that Part III’s case study
is in the area of patent law.287
A. Classic Scholarship
A good place to begin is with Paul J. Mishkin’s Foreword: The High
Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law in the 1965
Harvard Law Review.288 Professor Mishkin was responding to Linkletter
v. Walker, a case from that year which, according to the Court itself, was
the first time the Court had explicitly addressed retroactivity (at least as
to constitutional interpretation), though individual Justices had
previously written on it.289 He surmised that the Court’s previous absence
of discussion likely rested on the belief “that it is so ‘obvious’ as to be
taken for granted that whatever the Court now holds to be the law of the
Constitution becomes ‘what has always been the law’—even if the new
holding overrules an earlier decision of the Court.”290 The Court’s “prior
instincts in simply taking that approach for granted” were, in Mishkin’s
judgment, “quite sound.”291
Professor Mishkin recognized that the declaratory theory of law—that
courts simply find law rather than make it—is not entirely “an accurate
description of reality,” but in his view that did not “dispose of nor
dispense with the reasons for retroactive operation of judicial
decisions.”292 Given that it is “the basic role of courts to decide disputes
after they have arisen,” this function “requires that judicial decisions

287. Literature is discussed to the extent that it informs the issues addressed in this Article; this
is of course not meant to be an exhaustive review of the literature in any broader area such as
retroactivity, the Appointments Clause, or patent law.
288. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 56.
289. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965) (“It is true that heretofore without
discussion, we have applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of
the rule.”); Mishkin, supra note 288, at 57 (“Though no ‘opinion of the Court’ had ever discussed
the question, individual Justices had at different times advanced the suggestion that particular new
holdings of the Court should be given only prospective (or limited retroactive) effect.”) (citing
various dissents).
290. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 57.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 60.
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operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive effect.”293
Discussing institutional considerations, Professor Mishkin explained
that many aspects of the judiciary, such as strict standing requirements,
insulation from political pressure, and the nature of available relief, are
particularly well-suited toward resolving past disputes and not a regime
of prospective lawmaking.294 The adversary process generally relies on
the “incentive supplied by the possibility of winning a rewarding
judgment,” but if a new rule is given prospective-only effect (that is, pure
prospectivity), it “of course does not determine the judgment awarded in
the case in which it is announced,” and it follows that “if parties anticipate
such a prospective limitation, they will have no stimulus to argue for a
change in the law.”295 The possibility of pure prospectivity could thus
“deter counsel from advancing contentions involving novelty or
ingenuity.”296
These incentive concerns though might not apply for a repeat litigator
in a particular area, who still might have an interest in arguing for a
change in the law even if the change does not apply to the case at hand,
and Professor Mishkin recognized that such concerns do not necessarily
“constitute a barrier to occasional, sporadic, and unpredictable resort” to
prospectivity.297 He also acknowledged that these incentive concerns
would not apply to selective prospectivity, where the change is applied
retroactively only to the parties to the particular case in which the change
is announced, but in his view selective prospectivity “produces
intolerable inequality as well as other undesirable consequences.”298
While recognizing that the declaratory theory of law upon which
retroactivity is based does not entirely square with reality, as courts
sometimes do in a real sense change the law, Professor Mishkin
nevertheless viewed the declaratory theory as having important symbolic

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 60–61.
296. Id. at 61.
297. Id; See also id. at 61 n.20 (acknowledging that “institutional litigants” may have an
incentive to argue for a change in law even with prospectivity, but viewing this as an “inadequate
excuse for the prospective limitation technique,” given that it would destroy incentives for all other
litigants to argue for a change in law).
298. Id. at 61 n.23 (citing Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11 (Ill. 1959); Paul
Bender, The Retroactive Effect of Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 650, 675–76 (1962). As explained in Section I.B, selective prospectivity has been clearly
rejected under current retroactivity doctrine.
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significance,299 as reflected for example in judicial robes.300 The belief
that “judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply
that law impersonally as well as impartially, that they exercise no
individual choice and have no program of their own to advance” is “a
major factor in securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial
decisions.”301
Although recognizing that this symbolic notion of the declaratory
theory is “in part myth,” Professor Mishkin saw it as “a myth by which
we live and which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost.”302 And it is
not just a myth; it does embody “substantial elements of truth,” as judges
“in fact do not have completely unfettered choice,” and the “choices they
do have, though substantial and important, are still necessarily
conditioned by traditions, processes, and institutions of law.”303
Prospective judicial decision-making, Professor Mishkin points out,
“wars with this symbol,” as it is “generally equated with legislation,” and
indeed “the conscious confrontation of the question of an effective
date . . . smacks of the legislative process,”304 highlighting the fact that
the court has changed the law. And any selection of an effective date
“seems to involve an arbitrariness which is normally seen as inconsistent
with judicial action,” as “it is hard to provide reasoned grounds for
selecting one moment rather than another.”305
Professor Mishkin’s general rejection of prospectivity, though, is not a
rejection of legal change; to the contrary, he recognizes that “a totally
unadaptive body of law would disserve” the view that the law embodies
“Justice.”306 But he pointed out that judicial legal change can and does
occur despite retroactivity. To mitigate the potential unfairness of
retroactive legal change, he proposes that “demonstrated reliance” on a
prior representation of the law could be made “a shield against the impact

299. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 62 (“Despite (and perhaps also because of) its shortcomings as
a description of reality, the ‘declaratory theory’ expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial process
on which much of courts’ prestige and power depend.”) (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION—DECIDING APPEALS 191–95 (Little, Brown & Co.) (1960)).
300. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 63 n.29 (“Though I know that judges are human and quite
distinct individuals, I am not in favor of their doffing their robes, for I think there is value in
stressing, for themselves and for others, the quite real striving for an impersonality I know can
never be fully achieved.”).
301. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 62.
302. Id. at 63.
303. Id. (citing LLEWELLYN, supra note 299).
304. Id. at 64–65.
305. Id. at 66 n.37.
306. Id. at 66.
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of a newly changed law.”307 Others have made similar suggestions.308
This proposed technique of making the holding generally retroactive, but
not for the parties before the court if they can demonstrate reliance, seems
something like the mirror image of selective prospectivity (i.e., making
the holding generally prospective, but retroactive only for the present
parties), which seems to have been rejected by the current retroactivity
doctrine as a matter of choice-of-law, though not necessarily as a matter
of remedial discretion.309
Finally, beyond the symbolic, Professor Mishkin discussed the
functional effect that “retroactivity would seem to operate as an ‘inherent
restraint’ on judicial lawmaking because it compels the Court to confront
in sharpest form the possible undesirable consequences of adopting a new
rule,” such as when it “may result in imposing liability or other burden
on someone who acted in justified reliance on the old law.”310 Concern
about the possible retroactive imposition of harm could “thus tend to
restrain a court from adopting new law that is neither reflective of current
community standards nor adequately foreshadowed by prior judicial
developments.”311 The principal effects of such a restraint “go not to the
ultimate possibility” of judicial change but rather “to its pace,” that is,
slowing it down.312 The restraint of generally required retroactivity
encourages courts to gradually shift the law while foreshadowing future
changes, rather than make drastic changes.
Retroactivity thus strengthens stare decisis by forcing courts to
confront the potential unfairness of legal change when that change must
be made retroactive.313 This inherent restraint could be undercut
307. See id. at 66 n.39 (citing James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 241 (1961)).
308. See Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance, and Stare
Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1574 (1998) (“With respect to the demonstration of reliance,
it should be actual reliance in the usual case, which will be necessary to overcome the presumption
of retroactivity.”); Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 298 (2d. Cir. 1942) (Frank,
J., concurring).
309. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543–44 (opinion of Souter, J.,
announcing the judgment) (“Nor, finally, are litigants to be distinguished for choice-of-law
purposes on the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied on
the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive application of the new. . . . Conversely,
nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues
in particular cases.”); see also Fisch, supra note 24, at 1083 n.169 (“[A] judicial decision to
withhold certain relief under a retroactive rule need not be the equivalent of refusing to apply the
rule retroactively.”).
310. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 70 (citing James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 225 (1961)).
311. Id.; see supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing Flood v. Kuhn and the adherence
to precedence).
312. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 70.; see also id. at 72 (noting that public reaction may hinder
but does not block retroactive implementation).
313. Harper v. Va. Dept. of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Prospective
decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis.”).
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somewhat if it became commonplace to allow demonstrated justified
reliance to be a shield against retroactivity, as Professor Mishkin
suggested, though perhaps not entirely if the shield were left to potentially
unpredictable remedial discretion and required an actual showing of
reliance, which would not necessarily be easy.314 In other words, a
demonstrated reliance shield could mitigate the very unfairness that
serves as a restraint on overruling for judges who would prefer to avoid
the unfairness. So a demonstrated reliance shield could be seen as a
middle ground, mitigating but not eliminating potential unfairness of
retroactive legal change, and thus perhaps weakening stare decisis a bit,
but not as much as regular use of pure prospectivity.
Other commentary has been more receptive to prospectivity, at least in
the context of overruling a judicial decision. Perhaps most prominently,
Benjamin Cardozo as a scholar in The Nature of the Judicial Process
wrote:
[I]n the vast majority of cases the retrospective effect of judge-made
law is felt either to involve no hardship or only such hardship as is inevitable where no rule has been declared. I think it is significant that
when the hardship is felt to be too great or to be unnecessary, retrospective operation is withheld. Take the cases where a court of final appeal
has declared a statute void, and afterwards, reversing itself, declares the
statute valid. Intervening transactions have been governed by the first
decision. What shall be said of the validity of such transactions when
the decision is overruled? Most courts in a spirit of realism have held
that the operation of the statute has been suspended in the interval. It
may be hard to square such a ruling with abstract dogmas and definitions. When so much else that a court does, is done with retroactive
force, why draw the line here? The answer is, I think, that the line is
drawn here, because the injustice and oppression of a refusal to draw it
would be so great as to be intolerable.315

Cardozo also defended prospectivity as a Justice in Great Northern
Railway, reviewing the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to overrule
one of its precedents prospectively.316 The petitioner argued that
314. Cf. Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective
Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 643 (1967) (“To inject into every case an added requirement
that individual reliance be proved would seriously complicate the judicial process.”).
315. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146–47 (1921).
316. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 359 (1932). The Supreme
Court of Montana had held in 1921, in Doney v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 209 (Mont.
1921), that shippers could recover the overcharge for excessive rates, which had been made in
accordance with a tariff schedule approved by the Railroad Commission of Montana, though the
Commission later held that the rates approved were excessive and unreasonable. The Montana
Court “held that the ruling in the Doney case was erroneous and would not be followed in the
future,” but nevertheless held that “the Doney case was law until reversed and would constitute the
governing principle for shippers and carriers who, during the period of its reign, had acted on faith
of it.” i.e., the Montana Court overruled Doney prospectively. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. at 361.

678

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

“[a]dherence to precedent as establishing a governing rule for the past in
respect of the meaning of a statute” was “a denial of due process when
coupled with the declaration of an intention to refuse to adhere to it in
adjudicating any controversies growing out of transactions of the
future.”317 Justice Cardozo for the Court disagreed, holding the state
court’s practice of prospective overruling “involved no denial of a right
protected by the federal constitution,” such that a “state in defining the
limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the
principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.”318 That is,
without infringing the U.S. Constitution, a state court may practice
prospective overruling “whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be
averted,” or it may instead “hold to the ancient dogma that the law
declared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of
declaration, in which event the discredited declaration will be viewed as
if it had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as law from the
beginning.”319
According to Justice Cardozo, it made no difference “whether the
subject of the new decision is common law . . . or statute,” that is, whether
the court had overruled a prior decision or invalidated a statute; either
way, it was up to the state court to decide whether to make the effect
retroactive.320 The choice was to be “determined by the juristic
philosophy of the judges” of the state courts, and the Court did not pass
on the “wisdom of their philosophies,” but merely “the legality of their
acts,” holding that either choice was permissible under the U.S.
Constitution.321
B. Modern Scholarship
Some more recent scholarship has been highly critical of retroactivity
and has offered a more robust defense of prospectivity. Professor Jill
Fisch has proposed an “equilibrium approach” to retroactivity, wherein
retroactivity should be disfavored in situations where the law had
previously been settled in a stable equilibrium such that reliance interests
were at their peak.322 In her view, “the Court’s retroactivity analysis has
focused primarily on two prudential considerations: fairness and
efficiency,” with it being “typically thought that prospective laws are
more fair and retroactive laws are more efficient.”323
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 363–64.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 365.
Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. at 365.
See generally Fisch, supra note 24.
Id. at 1084.
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With regard to fairness, Professor Fisch points to Chevron Oil, which
“directs a court to inquire into the equitable aspects of application of a
new rule, including whether a litigant’s reliance on the prior rule should
be protected,” in consideration of the “need to protect settled
expectations” by not retroactively upsetting them.324 She claims, on the
other hand, that “efficiency is generally viewed as favoring
retroactivity.”325 This is apparently based on the “assumption that legal
change has occurred because of a determination that the new rule is an
improvement,” which “supports the application of that rule to as broad a
class of cases as possible,” particularly where “the new rule is curative or
restorative, that is, if it is designed to undo a rule perceived as
mistaken.”326
Professor Fisch thus offers her “equilibrium theory” as a touchstone
for retroactivity, explaining that a legal context “is in stable equilibrium
when the applicable legal rules are clear, have been promulgated by a
higher legal authority, have persisted over time and in a variety of specific
cases, and have not been widely criticized or questioned by lawmakers
with comparable authority.”327 She argues that in such situations, the
“existence of a stable equilibrium justifies the protection of reliancebased interests,” such that retroactivity should be avoided.328 On the other
hand, retroactivity “may be appropriate in certain circumstances,” such
as where “the legal change is sufficiently small that either it does not
disturb the equilibrium or the costs associated with the disturbance are
minimal,”329 or where the law is “in unstable equilibrium or a state of
flux.”330
Professor Fisch’s analysis seems to give short shrift to the strongest
arguments against judicial prospective-only decision-making. These
arguments are not about efficiency per se, but rather that prospective
lawmaking is generally contrary to the judicial role, that courts are not
institutionally well-suited for it, and that it tends over time to weaken
stare decisis leading to legal instability.331 That said, Professor Fisch’s
point that retroactivity is more likely to be unfair and upset reliance
324. Id. at 1085.
325. Id. at 1088 (citing, inter alia, Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transactions,
99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 615–16 (1986)).
326. Fisch, supra note 24, at 1088 (citing Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 306 n.71 (1993)).
327. Id. at 1102.
328. Id. at 1105–06.
329. Id. at 1106.
330. Id. at 1108. See also id. at 1109 (suggesting that reliance on prior law is unreasonable in
an unstable equilibrium, and that change results in minimal disruption of expectations when the
law is in flux).
331. See supra notes 301–304 and accompanying text (discussing Mishkin).
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interests in a situation where the law has long been settled in a state of
equilibrium, such that prospectivity may tend to be more appropriate in
such circumstances, is reasonable and worth keeping in mind.
In the patent context, Jonathan Masur and Adam Mortara have recently
argued in favor of increased prospective judicial decision-making.332
Professor Masur and Mr. Mortara point out that reliance interests are
particularly strong in the patent context, in that businesses are built
around existing patents, and if “patent rights become unreliable or
unstable, the purpose and function of the patent system will be
undermined,” and in the future, “innovators and investors might be much
more reluctant to pursue patent-based research if they have reason to fear
the Federal Circuit will pull the rug out from under them.”333
As Masur and Mortara recognize, the usual solution to this general
issue is just to adhere to stare decisis and not to drastically change the
law, or at least not often, as this is how retroactivity strengthens stare
decisis and serves as an inherent restraint on judicial legal change. But
the authors view this general approach as “a poor fit for patent law,”
where they claim the law “must be frequently updated if it is to keep pace
with changes in technology and markets.”334
As a solution, Masur and Mortara urge that “federal courts—or at least
patent courts [by which they apparently mean the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which generally hears all patent appeals]—should
be given the authority to hand down decisions that are prospective
only.”335 This would “decouple a judicial decision’s prospective effect—
which is presumptively positive—from the backward-looking harm it
might do to investment-backed expectations and reliance interests,” such
that patent law “would become more dynamic and less hidebound,” and
“would also become more effective.”336 To be clear, under Chevron Oil,
all courts seem to already have the rarely used prospectivity authority that
Masur and Mortara argue for,337 but their article primarily argues for
increased use of this authority in the patent context by the Federal Circuit,
because in their view prospectivity is particularly appropriate in patent
law.338
332. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara, Patents, Property, and
Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L. REV. 963 (2019).
333. Id. at 965–66.
334. Id. at 967 (citing Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 855, 878–79 (2007)).
335. Id. at 968.
336. Id.; see also id. at 998 (citing Kaplow, supra note 325, at 551–52).
337. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. It is perhaps notable that Masur and Mortara do
not even cite Chevron Oil. See generally Masur & Mortara, supra note 332.
338. See Masur & Mortara, supra note 332, at 996–97 (“[C]ourts issue purely prospective legal
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There are some issues with this argument. To begin with, Masur and
Mortara’s argument for increased prospectivity particularly in patent law
runs counter the Supreme Court’s consistent admonitions in recent
decades that patent law is subject to the same general principles of law as
any other area; in other words, that it is not exceptional.339 It could also
tend to undermine the principle that similarly situated litigants should be
treated the same by potentially making the validity of a patent turn on the
happenstance of whether it was issued (or applied for) the day before
versus the day after a particular judicial legal change took effect.340 There
are also the significant logistical difficulties that courts and litigants
would face in lawsuits with multiple asserted patents, having to
potentially apply different law for each patent depending on the patent’s
application or issuance date.
And perhaps most saliently, the argument undermines itself. Masur
and Mortara correctly point out that stability is particularly important in
patent law, in part because of “the lag time between R&D investments
and patent rewards.”341 That is, firms invest “in R&D with the belief that
some number of years down the road, it will be able to recoup those
investments and turn a profit by leveraging the patents it has obtained.”342
So Masur and Mortara correctly argue that if “patent law is generally
unstable, innovative firms (or investors) may fear that they will never
recoup their R&D investments and therefore refrain from making those
investments in the first place.”343 Yet their entire argument is geared
toward making it easier for courts to change patent law by allowing more
prospective decision-making, because “[d]oing so would permit brisk
rulings only rarely, despite indications from the Supreme Court that they are permitted to do so. It
is time for patents courts to avail themselves of this opportunity.”).
339. See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413,
1416 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently sought to eliminate patent exceptionalism,
bringing patent law in conformity with what it characterizes as general legal standards.”) (citing
cases).
340. Professor Masur and Mr. Mortara are not entirely clear on whether their proposal makes
the applicable law that of the date the patent was granted (i.e., issued), or the date the patent was
applied for. Compare Masur & Mortara, supra note 332, at 968 (“[F]ederal courts—or at least
patent courts—should . . . have the power to determine that a particular decision affects only patents
whose owners applied for them on or after the date of that decision.”), with id. at 996 (“The solution
is to decouple the effects on future patents from the effects on existing patents—to allow courts to
make positive changes affecting patents that will be granted in the future without similarly affecting
patents that already exist.”). Presumably either might be accomplished via a prospective ruling at
the Federal Circuit coupled with a general rule of patent law that the applicable law in patent suits
is that of either date, rather than the current law (or simply, “the law”), as it is now understood to
be.
341. Id. at 970–71.
342. Id. (citing Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouelette, Beyond the Patent-Prizes Debate,
92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 310–12, 319–20, 326 (2013)).
343. Id. at 972.
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legal change,” thus making patent law less stable, or as they put it, “more
dynamic and less hidebound.”344
Masur and Mortara attempt to address this apparent inconsistency by
arguing that a “nonretroactive decision, by not impinging on existing
patent rights, does not upset existing reliance interests and thus does not
threaten to diminish investment incentives.”345 But the relevant reliance
interests are not limited to existing patents, for as Masur and Mortara
themselves argued, there is a significant “lag time between R&D
investments and patent rewards,”346 in that it may take years of R&D
before a firm is ready to even apply for a patent, and then a few more
years for the patent to issue.347 Masur and Mortara recognize that for this
reason, prospectivity “will not necessarily protect all of the reliance
interests involved,” but dismiss this point by stating “nonretroactivity
will be at least a partial solution, and one preferable to a fully retroactive
judicial decision.”348 However, in this regard, they do not address the
point (which they themselves made earlier as a feature of their argument)
that increased prospective decision-making will weaken adherence to
stare decisis and make overruling and legal change more common. Thus,
although prospective legal change will reduce the reliance interests upset
by any particular change, it will still upset some reliance interests, so
encouraging more of it may well ultimately upset reliance interests to a
greater degree overall.
One might be able to live with all this if accelerated legal change in
344. Id. at 968, 1022; see also id. at 999 (“[I]nsisting that a new legal rule be both prospective
and retroactive may make it more difficult to enact a legal change . . . .”).
345. Id. at 1001.
346. Id. at 970–71; see also id. at 1005–06 (“[A] firm might invest billions of dollars in R&D
for a single type of invention, believing that it will be able to obtain patents related to this invention
for decades to come.”).
347. See Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan Marco, What Is the Probability of Receiving a
U.S. Patent?, 17 YALE J. L. & TECH. 203, 205 n.5 (2015) (“[T]he average patent application pends
for four to five years at the USPTO before it is granted . . . .”). If the applicable law is that of the
application date rather than the grant date (see supra, note 340), the disruption of reliance interests
is mitigated further, though still not completely, given that much investment takes place prior to
application. And this could create its own host of problems, such as forcing patent examiners to
examine co-pending patent applications under different sets of law at the same time, and potentially
encouraging applicants to game the system by abandoning and re-filing applications to gain the
benefit of patent-friendly but prospective-only judicial decision. Indeed, Masur and Mortara
confusingly suggest that prospectivity is more appropriate when the change strengthens patent
rights. See Masur & Mortara, supra note 332, at 1003 (“While there is often a strong argument in
favor of issuing a retroactive decision that invalidates or weakens patents, decisions that expand or
strengthen patent rights should very rarely be made retroactive.”). This would seem to be in some
tension their general argument that retroactively weakening patent law to render existing patents
invalid upsets reliance interests. See, e.g., id. at 965 (“Changing the law would risk upending the
business and, worse, invalidating the patents might deter future investments in research and
development (R&D).”).
348. Masur & Mortara, supra note 332, at 1005–06.
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patent law were really as clearly desirable as Masur and Mortara posit,
based on their assumption that “the new rule is likely superior to the old
rule,”349 but that is a dubious proposition. Masur and Mortara argue that
it is particularly important for patent law to be “‘correct’ (or nearly so) if
it is to be effective,” by which they presumably mean to adequately
balance incentives for innovation against the monopoly dead-weight-loss
costs on society imposed by patents, and to incentivize “genuine
innovation” instead of “unproductive projects.”350
The problem, however, is that there are widely varying reasonable
views on what “correct” patent law looks like, and the “correct” answer
is very difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain because one cannot know
the counterfactual degree or type of innovation that would have occurred
under a different patent regime in a given time and place.351 Innovation
is inherently unpredictable by its very nature: it generally consists of
things not yet known.352 It is very difficult to know in advance precisely
what a change in law might help us discover in the future.
Also, the precise value of additional innovation to society is debatable
and depends on the type of innovation as well as how it is used, 353 so
even if we could accurately foresee the effects on innovation of each
potential change to patent law, reasonable people would still disagree
about at what point the societal cost of granting additional monopolies
outweighs the societal benefit of the additional innovation to be received.
The effects also depend to some degree on the area of technology; in
certain sectors patents may help startups more than incumbents and
349. Id. at 998 (“The first and most obvious advantage of making the new rule fully retroactive
is that it is likely superior to the old rule. (If not, it would be odd to adopt it.)”) (citing Kaplow,
supra note 325, at 551–52, as “describing the virtues of legal transitions and reasons for expediting
them.”). The cited portion of Kaplow’s article favors retroactivity “when the justification for a
reform suggests that the prior activity was undesirable,” but not “if a new rule were established in
response to a change in circumstances.” Kaplow, supra note 325, at 551–52. This is a reasonable
point in that when a change in law is in response to changed circumstances, it may make marginally
less sense to retroactively apply the new rule to events prior to that change; but it does not
particularly support the claim that new rules are likely to be superior in general, or that legal change
should be expedited in general.
350. Masur & Mortara, supra note 332, at 970.
351. See Lisa Larrimore Ouelette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 66–68 (2015)
(“Despite well over a century of intense interest, we lack answers to fundamental empirical
questions in patent law. . . . Locking the world into uniformly strong patent protection simply
makes it more difficult to address these questions because empirical progress depends on policy
variation.”).
352. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (requiring novelty as a condition for patentability).
353. See, e.g., ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 295 (1956) (“The machine is bad only in the way
that it is now employed. Its benefits must be accepted even if its ravages are rejected.”); MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 33 (1977) (“The essence of technology
is in a lofty sense ambiguous.”); Shawn Bayern, Why I Don’t Blog, HUFFPOST (June 20, 2010),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-i-dont-blog-yes-i-rec_b_542127
[https://perma.cc/C6V8L2U7] (“The problem isn’t technology; it’s what we’re doing with it.”).
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reduce market concentration, which could be viewed as a benefit of the
patent system even though it is not traditionally thought of as a primary
goal of patent law.354
Importantly, there are strongly held and widely varying views on
patent policy at the Federal Circuit—the primary court targeted by Masur
and Mortara’s proposal—with some judges believing in strong patent
rights much more than others.355 This variance is currently at least
tempered by respect for stare decisis.356 While we cannot make patent
law perfectly “correct,” we can at least keep it relatively stable, and that
has value in itself, as Masur and Mortara recognize.357 If the Federal
Circuit were encouraged to overrule prior decisions more often, it seems
unlikely that the result would be a steady march toward greater
correctness rather than a semi-random oscillation based on the
idiosyncratic policy views of the judges composing particular panels or
the court in general. Forcing the court to, at least in most cases, weigh the
potential benefits of a change in law against the full weight of
retroactively upset reliance interests helps ensure that when the court does
change the law, it has reached a greater degree of consensus and certainty
that the change actually will be beneficial.
354. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 81 (2011) (explaining
that intellectual property can “allow the makers of the input to set themselves up as a separate,
independent firm,” which “gives them more say over their work, more control over their
professional fate—more autonomy.”); Andrew C. Michaels, The Patent Lawyer’s Guide to
Fascism: On Individual Autonomy and Private Law, 49 N.M. L. REV. 169, 181–85 (2019)
(discussing patents and market concentration); cf. Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and
Innovation, Q. J. OF ECON. 395, 408-409 (1979) (“Social welfare can be maximized by
appropriately limiting entry and firm investments with licensing fees and finite patent life.”).
355. See, e.g., Ted L. Field, Hyperactive Judges: An Empirical Study of Judge-Dependent
‘Judicial Hyperactivity’ in the Federal Circuit, 38 VT. L. REV. 625, 627 (2014) (“Many patent
practitioners believe that decision-making by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
highly judge-dependent.”) (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges
Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745 (2000); Craig Allen Nard & John
F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2007)
(“[O]ne of the prominent criticisms of the Federal Circuit is that the court exhibits ‘panel
dependency.’”)).
356. See, e.g., Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“This court
has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent
panels unless and until overturned in banc. . . . When there is direct conflict, the precedential
decision is the first.”).
357. Masur & Mortara, supra note 332, at 970 (“One of the peculiarities of patent law is that it
must also be relatively stable.”); In re Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“[C]learly within the congressionally envisioned role of this court, i.e., to contribute to doctrinal
stability in the field of patent law.”); cf. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1982) (en banc) (Markey, J.) (adopting as Federal Circuit precedent the “body of law represented
by the holdings of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,” for to
“proceed without precedent, deciding each legal principle anew, would for too long deprive the bar
and the public of the stability and predictability essential to the effort of a free society to live under
a rule of law.”).
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Interestingly, another recent and prominent article on general
retroactivity (not specifically focused on patent law or the Appointments
Clause) makes essentially the opposite proposal from Masur and Mortara,
arguing that the Court should place the nails in the coffin of Chevron Oil
and remove the possibility of prospective overruling altogether.358
Professor Beswick criticizes the various conceptions of prospective
judicial decision-making, including what he refers to as the “remedial
framework,”359 and proposes a “right-of-action” framework, which
“embraces the retroactivity of judicial precedent,” but still allows that
“equitable principles” should “be employed when the ordinary
adjudication of rights in the light of novel precedent would lead to
injustice.”360
Professor Beswick distinguishes the “remedial framework,” which he
rejects, from these remedial equitable considerations by shifting the focus
from whether the legal change was unpredictable to the individual
equities of each case.361 In his view, the “remedial framework produces
a one-size-fits-all outcome,” whereas his proposed framework is more
“attuned to the rights and interests of parties before adjudicating
courts.”362 What Professor Beswick calls the “remedial framework”
seems to be essentially the view that Chevron Oil type prospectivity is
itself really a matter of remedies rather than choice-of-law—a view
espoused by Justice Stevens and possibly acquiesced to by Judge
O’Connor.363 This view, which again Professor Beswick rejects, might
seem to collapse the remedial and choice-of-law analyses and thereby
eliminate the arguably important distinction between the two.
Terminology aside, nothing about Professor Beswick’s primary
proposal seems terribly contrary to the approach of this Article. What is
referred to as “remedial discretion” in this Article seems more in line with
Professor Beswick’s right-of-action framework than with what he terms
the “remedial framework,” in that a court’s “remedial discretion” as
discussed herein involves a decision about the appropriate relief in an

358. See Samuel Beswick, Retroactive Adjudication, 130 YALE L. J. 276, 365 (2020) (“The
Court should take the final step by collapsing the presumption [of adjudicative retroactivity] into
acceptance.”).
359. See id. at 332 (“The remedial framework is not grounded in traditional equitable
considerations of prejudice or hardship to a defendant. . . . This is its flaw.”).
360. Id. at 337–39.
361. See id. at 337 (“This framework reorients judges’ focus onto the claims that are currently
before them”).
362. Id. at 354.
363. See id. at 328 (distinguishing the remedial framework from choice of law, “Under [the
remedial framework judgements always operate retroactively for the purpose of determining what
the law was, but courts may employ equitable considerations to curb the remedial impact . . . .”);
supra notes 144–145; supra Section I.B.3.

686

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

individual case in light of the case’s equities after and apart from an
acceptance of a judicial decision’s usual retroactive effect as a matter of
what is herein referred to as choice-of-law.
Moving on, the prior literature on retroactivity in the Appointments
Clause context is sparse but not nonexistent. Professor Elizabeth Beske
has recently observed that the “Court’s struggle to reconcile its dueling
impulses to soften the blow of disruptive legal change and adhere to
principles of adjudicative retroactivity is likely to erupt again soon in a
new context,” given that “the Court has decided three significant
Appointments Clause cases in the past eight years.”364 She argues that in
such cases, courts should balance the disruption occasioned by remanding
for new hearings against the harm or unfairness to individual litigants of
not remanding, and that such a balancing is consistent with the Court’s
existing jurisprudence.365
Recently in Lucia, the Court found that the SEC ALJ that heard the
petitioner’s case had not been properly appointed and remanded for a new
hearing before a different, properly appointed ALJ.366 Professor Beske
notes that in briefing, “Lucia’s counsel identified thirteen other pending
cases in which litigants had preserved objections” that would likely
require rehearing, such that the “sky would not fall” were the Court to
order remands in all of those cases.367 Professor Beske observes,
however, that “it will be difficult to cabin this decision to SEC ALJs, and
the Court’s rationale is likely to reach the more than 1600 ALJs who work
in the Social Security Administration,” and who “handle upwards of
650,500 hearings a year,” such that “the Court will be challenged to
articulate a mechanism for confining the systemic disruptions of its
handiwork.”368 As such, “the logic of Lucia may compel the Court to
confront very hard questions of far greater disruption in the immediate
future.”369
In Professor Beske’s view, the Court’s “situation-specific mention of
the number of affected cases,” seven to ten in Ryder,370 and thirteen in
364. Beske, supra note 7, at 693 (citing Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477
(2010)).
365. Id. at 650–51.
366. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (describing the new hearing as an appropriate
remedy).
367. Beske, supra note 7, at 697–98 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 48–49, Lucia, 138 S. Ct.
2044 (No. 17-130)).
368. Id. at 693–94 (citing Alan Morrison, Symposium: Lucia v. SEC—More Questions than
Answers, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-luciav-sec-more-questions-than-answers/ [https://perma.cc/4SXY-BUFW]).
369. Id. at 698.
370. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the minimal disruption provoked
in Ryder).
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Lucia (mentioned in the Court’s opinion in Ryder though not in Lucia),
leaves “room for the proposition that cases posing greater dislocation and
negative effects may require a different resolution.”371 On the other side
of the balance, the “Court’s frequent suggestion that the injuries of
individual litigants occasioned by Appointments Clause violations are
largely symbolic, and its repeated expression of the need to incentivize
litigants,” potentially suggest that new hearings might not be required in
all cases where a greater degree of disruption would be caused.372
This Article agrees with Professor Beske that in situations such as
Lucia and Ryder where there is no judicial fix, this sort of balancing is
likely appropriate for a court determining whether to grant de facto
validity to prior agency actions, as the Court did in Buckley, where the
degree of disruption would have been high and no retrospective relief was
even requested.373
But this Article primarily is focused on the situation, as in Free
Enterprise and Seila Law, where there is a judicial fix—a situation that
Professor Beske does not much address. Where there is a judicial fix, the
analysis must be different, as the fix presumptively applies retroactively,
so application of the de facto validity doctrine is not necessary. While
remedial discretion allows for remands in such situations, the
presumption should generally be against a remand, at least in the
Appointments Clause context where in light of loosened traceability
requirements, it cannot automatically be assumed that the constitutional
defect had any impact on past hearings.374 Thus, the practical effect may
be a flipping of the presumption; a judicial fix is presumptively
retroactive so presumptively no rehearing is required, whereas if there is
no judicial fix, rehearings are presumptively required unless the court
chooses to grant de facto validity.
This reversal of the presumption is driven by foundational retroactivity
principles and the declaratory theory: the judiciary mostly “acts”
retroactively and the other branches usually act only prospectively. That
remands should tend to be less common where there is a judicial fix is
also in accord with the notion that a statutory unconstitutionality that can
be “fixed” judicially should tend to be less serious than one that cannot
be fixed.375 Where a court through interpretation or severance is able to
371. Beske, supra note 7, at 698.
372. Id. at 698–99.
373. See supra notes 189–191, and accompanying text (explaining the Buckley holding).
374. See Beske, supra note 7, at 699 (“[T]he Court itself has admitted that rarely, if ever, can
they show that the results in their cases would have been different before a properly appointed
decision maker.”).
375. Cf. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1987) (“[T]he unconstitutional
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use “a scalpel rather than a bulldozer” to “limit the solution to the
problem,” the effects should naturally tend to be less disruptive as
compared with where a court cannot fix the unconstitutionality.376 Where
the unconstitutionality has not been fixed, the invalidation of the statute
retroactively takes away the authority for prior actions, unless de facto
validity is granted.377
Professor Beske notes that there is often only an attenuated connection
between a petitioner’s injury and any alleged Appointments Clause issue,
such that “these structural challenges rest uneasily with conventional
Article III standing,” but nevertheless the Court has long allowed
regulated parties to raise these claims. That is, “courts have not required
litigants to demonstrate that a properly-constituted tribunal would have
rendered a different decision.”378
Although the connection may not be immediately apparent, this
relationship between the Court’s loosened traceability requirements in
Appointments Clause cases379 and the lesser need for a new hearing is
worth drawing out. When a petitioner challenges the structure of the
agency that heard their claim, it may be unlikely that any defect in the
agency structure had any impact on their case, but that has not prevented
standing. A petitioner who prevails in finding a constitutional defect in
the agency’s structure has sometimes been afforded a new hearing even
despite the lack of any likely connection between that defect and the
outcome of the prior hearing, where granting such a new hearing to the
petitioner and those similarly situated would not cause major disruption.
But where the disruption would be greater, granting new hearings may
not be wise or necessary.
The Arthrex situation discussed next, with its number of affected
hearings being somewhere in the neighborhood of one hundred,
illustrates this type of disruptive situation that might have warranted not
granting new hearings, with the added wrinkle of a judicially imposed fix
provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would
not have enacted.”).
376. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2209–10 (2020)
(“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the
solution to the problem, severing any problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.”
(quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010))); Seila Law,
140 S. Ct. at 2210–11 (“We think it clear that Congress would prefer that we use a scalpel rather
than a bulldozer in curing the constitutional defect we identify today.”).
377. See Beske, supra note 7, at 697 (“Buckley had granted relief and invoked a different
doctrine, ‘de facto validity,’ as a mechanism for circumscribing the new rules’ retroactive effect.”).
378. Id. at 694 (citing Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1495–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). See also
supra notes 252–50 (explaining Thomas’ dissent in Seila Law).
379. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in Collins);
Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 586 (5th Cir. 2019) (majority opinion); Free Enter. Fund, 561
U.S. at 512 n.12.
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that—properly considered—would have rendered such remands entirely
unnecessary and at least mostly imprudent.
III. A CASE STUDY: ARTHREX
This harrowing and twisted tale begins on Halloween 2019, when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its panel
decision in Arthrex.380 Arthrex was appealing directly from a decision of
the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB), which is part of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The PTAB had held
invalid certain claims from Arthrex’s U.S. Patent No. 9,179,907 (“the
’907 patent”), directed to “a knotless suture securing assembly.”381
Arthrex’s prevailing argument on appeal was not that the claims were in
fact valid, but rather that the PTAB was unconstitutionally structured
because the PTAB’s Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) had been
appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause.382
The PTAB was created by the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011,383
which provides that the APJs are appointed by the Secretary of
Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the USPTO.384 The
PTAB hears challenges to patents in panels of three APJs via various
proceedings, one of which is called inter partes review (IPR).385 IPR
proceedings, although intended as a more cost-effective and faster way to
challenge the validity of patents as compared with district court, are
nevertheless lengthy and expensive, generally costing in the six figures
and lasting eighteen months from the initial petition to the agency final
written decision, from which an appeal can be taken directly to the
Federal Circuit.386 The Arthrex case was appealed to the Federal Circuit
380. See generally Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex 141 U.S. 549 (2020).
381. Id. at 1325.
382. Id.
383. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
384. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed by the Secretary, in consultation with the
Director.”).
385. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1326 (“A three-judge panel of Board members then conducts the
instituted inter partes review.”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(c)).
386. See, e.g., e-Watch Inc. v. Avigilon Corp., No. 13-0347, 2013 WL 6633936, at *2 n.3 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 17, 2013) (“Avigilon’s counsel explained during the hearing that it is expensive to pursue
inter partes review. The filing fee for the IPR petition is $25,000.00. Additionally, the petitioner
incurs very substantial attorneys’ fees for the petition, discovery, trial before the PTAB, and all
associated briefing.”); RPX, 2015 REPORT: NPE LITIGATION, PATENT MARKETPLACE, AND NPE
COST 5 (2016) (“IPR petition costs are generally in the six figures: $200 thousand on the low end,
and $700 thousand on the high end, for those that reach a final decision.”). A decision on whether
to institute an IPR proceeding must be made within six months of the filing of the petition, and a
final written decision must generally be issued within twelve months of an institution decision. See
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by Arthrex, the patent owner, from an IPR final written decision which
had held invalid (as “anticipated” by “prior art”) some of the claims of
Arthrex’s ’907 patent.387
The Appointments Clause provides that principal officers must be
appointed by the president, but that Congress may choose to vest the
appointment of “inferior officers” in “the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.”388 Thus, assuming that the APJs are “Officers of the
United States,” if the APJs were properly classified as “inferior officers,”
then they were properly appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, but if
they were instead really “principal officers,” then it was unconstitutional
for Congress to vest their appointment in the Secretary rather than the
president.389
The court first found, uncontroversially, that the APJs were “Officers
of the United States,” rather than mere employees, because they “exercise
significant authority.”390 The question then became whether they were
principal or inferior officers, which the court stated turns on three factors:
“(1) whether an appointed official has the power to review and reverse
the officers’ decision; (2) the level of supervision and oversight an
appointed official has over the officers; and (3) the appointed official’s
power to remove the officers.”391
The central consideration, according to the court, is the “extent of
direction or control” that appointed officials have over the officers and
their decision-making on behalf of the executive branch, as the “ultimate
concern is ‘preserving political accountability.’”392 Given that the “only
two presidentially-appointed officers that provide direction to the
USPTO are the Secretary of Commerce and the Director,” the court found
that neither of those officers “exercises sufficient direction and
supervision over the APJs to render them inferior officers.”393
As such, the court ultimately concluded that the APJs were “principal
officers” that would have to be appointed by the president and confirmed
by the Senate, and because they were not, “the current structure of the

35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 316(a)(11), 319 (describing the time requirements related to making a final
determination on an IPR proceeding).
387. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1325–26 (“[T]he Board issued a final written decision finding the
claims unpatentable as anticipated.”); 35 U.S.C. § 102.
388. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (describing the President’s appointment power); supra notes
171–173 and accompanying text.
389. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1327 (explaining the distinction between inferior officers and
principal officers).
390. Id. at 1327–28.
391. Id. at 1328–29 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)).
392. Id. at 1329 (citing Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663).
393. Id.
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Board violates the Appointments Clause.”394 This conclusion turned on
the fact that the relevant statutes made the APJs removable only for
cause.395 Title 35 § 3(c) provides that all officers and employees of the
USPTO are “subject to the provisions of title 5,”396 which according to
the court, provide that “APJs may be removed ‘only for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service.’”397
The court, however, viewed this problem as curable by severing “the
application of Title 5’s removal restrictions to APJs.”398 The court
viewed this “as-applied severance” as “the narrowest possible
modification to the scheme Congress created and cures the constitutional
violation.”399 With Title 5 thus altered or construed so as to make the
APJs removable by the Secretary at will, the court viewed them as
inferior officers, properly appointed by the Secretary.400 This sort of “asapplied severance” is essentially a combination of statutory interpretation
and severing a portion of the statute as unconstitutional, and it is
somewhat controversial, though certainly not unheard of.401
Having admirably analyzed the issues thus far, the court then took a
consequential misstep, stating: “Because the Board’s decision in this case
was made by a panel of APJs that were not constitutionally appointed at
the time the decision was rendered, we vacate and remand the Board’s
decision without reaching the merits.”402 It was not necessarily beyond
the court’s power to vacate and remand, but the notion that the APJs
“were not constitutionally appointed at the time the decision was
rendered,” but then became constitutional as result of the court’s decision
is contrary to foundational retroactivity principles in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence and the declaratory theory of law upon which they are
based.403

394. Id. at 1335.
395. Id. at 1332–34.
396. 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) (“Officers and employees of the Office shall be subject to the provisions
of title 5, relating to Federal employees.”).
397. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1333 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)).
398. Id. at 1337 (“Title 5’s removal protections cannot be constitutionally applied to APJs, so
we sever that application of the statute.”); see also id. at 1338 (“[W]e hold unconstitutional the
statutory removal provisions as applied to APJs, and sever that application.”); see also id. (“We
hold that the application of Title 5’s removal protections to APJs is unconstitutional and must be
severed.”).
399. Id. at 1337.
400. Id. at 1338.
401. See David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 654
(2008) (explaining how a court might invalidate a statute as applied to a set of facts and that it might
need to add words to qualify what the legislature did).
402. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1338–39.
403. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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The court thus essentially made its fix, the as-applied severance,
prospective only in operation, but it did so without discussing the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity and prospectivity and
without conducting any Chevron Oil analysis or explaining why this fix
should be exempted from the presumptive general principles of
retroactivity. There is also a degree of inconsistency in that the court
made its declaration of unconstitutionality retroactive, but made the fix
only prospective, and made no attempt to provide a reasoned basis for
this difference.
If the court had conducted a Chevron Oil analysis, it is unlikely that it
would have supported prospective-only application of the fix. Recall that
Chevron Oil provides three factors for courts to analyze when considering
whether to make a decision prospective only in operation: (1) whether the
subsequent decision changed the law in an unforeseeable manner; (2) the
purpose and history of the rule in question; and (3) whether retroactive
application would create inequity, injustice, or hardship.404 On the first
factor, the Arthrex as-applied severance was based on existing Court
precedent on the Appointments Clause, so in that sense it did not change
the law and was not particularly unforeseeable. Retroactive application
of the fix would not likely create inequity or hardship, because as
discussed below, it is implausible that the removal restrictions had any
effect whatsoever on the PTAB final written decisions at issue.
Furthermore, the purpose of the America Invents Act was in part to create
an efficient, faster, and cheaper forum in which to challenge the validity
of patents,405 and the Federal Circuit’s wasteful and unnecessary remands
causing additional administrative expense and delay are contrary to that
purpose.
Regardless of whether the panel decision is viewed as one of statutory
construction or severance, the decision presumptively operates
retroactively, as judicial decisions generally do. That is, the statute as
interpreted or altered by the court was always the correct way to read the
statute; it at least presumptively did not become the law at the time of the
decision. That presumption was ignored by the Federal Circuit, and even
if that presumption arguably could have been overturned, the court did
not conduct a Chevron Oil analysis, nor did the court even discuss the
doctrine of retroactivity or prospectivity.
404. See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The America Invents Act created a new expert tribunal, charged to act
with expedition and economy.”); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 781 F.3d
1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Hughes, J., dissenting) (“The AIA was ‘designed to establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and
counterproductive litigation costs.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 40 (2011)).
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Although it might initially seem strange to say that the APJs were
always constitutional in light of the retroactive judicial fix, one way to
think about it is that if an APJ had been removed, and then had challenged
the removal as being without cause, the challenge would have failed
because the courts ultimately would have found the removal restrictions
unconstitutional as applied to the APJs, just as the Arthrex court did. This
view, as discussed above, is admittedly somewhat formalist in that it
implies a single right answer that could have been foreseen despite the
contrary statutory representation, but this useful partial fiction is part of
the law and has been for a long time.406 And it is perhaps just as strange
or spooky to say that the APJs somehow went from unconstitutional to
constitutional on that Halloween day or some other effective date,
especially given that the panel decision remained subject to petitions for
rehearing en banc and certiorari.
Based on Lucia, the panel stated that “Appointments Clause remedies
are designed to advance structural purposes of the Appointments Clause
and to incentivize Appointments Clause challenges,” and concluded that
“both of these justifications support our decision today to vacate and
remand.”407 The court held that, on remand, a different panel of three
APJs must hear the case, but left it up to the PTAB whether it should
allow additional briefing or reopen the record.408
The court “decided only that this case, where the final decision was
rendered by a panel of APJs who were not constitutionally appointed and
where the parties presented an Appointments Clause challenge on appeal,
must be vacated and remanded,” and saw “the impact of this case as
limited to those cases where final written decisions were issued and
where litigants present an Appointments Clause challenge on appeal.”409
This has been interpreted to mean basically that remands are required in
any case where the PTAB had issued a “final written decision” before
Halloween 2019 and the appellant has not waived the issue; dozens of
cases have been remanded under this requirement.410
406. See supra Section I.A (discussing why retroactivity is a useful partial fiction).
407. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1340 (citing Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n.5 (2018)).
408. See id. (“[O]n remand we hold that a new panel of APJs must be designated and a new
hearing granted. . . .[W]e see no error in the new panel proceeding on the existing written record
but leave to the Board’s sound discretion whether it should allow additional briefing or reopen the
record in any individual case.”).
409. Id.
410. See Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 941 F.3d 1174, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(concluding that Customedia forfeited its Appointments Clause challenge and denying the motion
to vacate and remand); see also Ciena Corp. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, 958 F.3d 1157, 1159 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (denying remand where it was requested by the IPR petitioner, i.e., the patent challenger, and
the IPR petitioner did not raise the Appointments Clause issue before the PTAB, reasoning that the
IPR petitioner “affirmatively sought a ruling from Board members, regardless of how they were
appointed.”).
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A concern with incentives at best supported a remand in the Arthrex
case itself as a matter of remedial discretion, but it does not support the
dozens of other remands that have wastefully occurred. There is no reason
to continue to incentivize Appointments Clause challenges after the court
has already decided the issue in a different case. Indeed, automatically
remanding in all pending cases as the Federal Circuit did could actually
dilute the relevant incentives, encouraging parties to nominally raise the
issue but not devote significant resources (e.g., brief space, attorney
attention, etc.) to it, free riding off of the work of the party that actually
argued the issue sufficiently to win the challenge. But because the Arthrex
court erroneously viewed remand as required by law rather than as an
exercise of discretion, subsequent Federal Circuit panels have not felt free
to consider whether remand is prudent or not.
The Arthrex court’s error did not go unnoticed. One week later, an
entirely different panel of the court released its opinion in Bedgear.411
Bedgear, LLC was appealing from three final written decisions of the
PTAB and had made the Appointments Clause argument in briefing; the
panel’s one paragraph per curiam opinion merely stated that in light of
Arthrex, the PTAB final written decisions were vacated, and the case was
remanded for further consistent proceedings.412
However, Judge Dyk wrote a concurrence in the judgment, joined by
Judge Newman, wherein he faulted the Arthrex panel for failing to make
its fix retroactive.413 In his view, the Arthrex panel’s remedy requiring a
new hearing was not required by Lucia and “imposes large and
unnecessary burdens on the system of inter partes review, requiring
potentially hundreds of new proceedings, and involves unconstitutional
prospective decision-making.”414 It may have been an overstatement to
call the fix’s lack of retroactivity unconstitutional,415 but it was at least
improper under Supreme Court precedent for the Federal Circuit to make
the fix prospective only without any Chevron Oil–type analysis, and as
explained above, such an analysis likely would not have supported the
prospective-only fix.416
According to Judge Dyk, the panel improperly made “the application
of its decision prospective only, so that only PTAB decisions after the
date of the panel’s opinion are rendered by a constitutionally appointed
411. Bedgear, LLC v. Fredman Bros. Furniture Co., 783 F. App’x 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(nonprecedential).
412. Id. at 1030.
413. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring).
414. Id.
415. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing Great N. R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932)).
416. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
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panel.”417 It may initially seem counterintuitive to call the Arthrex
panel’s decision prospective only, given that the court vacated and
remanded the past hearings. In fact the entire decision was not made
prospective only: the declaration of unconstitutionality was made
retroactive (as it should have been), but the Arthrex court’s fix, that is, the
as-applied severance of removal protections, was effectively made
prospective only (though the panel did not call it that), such that the prior
PTAB decisions were, as the Arthrex panel put it “made by a panel of
APJs that were not constitutionally appointed at the time the decision was
rendered.”418 If the fix had been considered retroactive, as it should have
been and as the declaration of unconstitutionality was, the prior PTAB
decisions were not rendered by a panel that was unconstitutional “at the
time” because the unconstitutional statutory removal restrictions were
always merely a mirage-like misrepresentation of the law, and thus void
ab initio.419
This judicial fix is the basis for a distinction from the Court’s decision
in Lucia, which the Arthrex panel relied on. As Judge Dyk pointed out,
in Lucia there was no judicial fix to make retroactive.420 To the extent
that there was a fix in Lucia, it came from the agency itself, and thus was
properly considered prospective only in operation, as unlike the judicial
branch, the executive branch must generally act prospectively.421 But
because the Arthrex court had judicially fixed the problem through its asapplied severance, in Judge Dyk’s view, “to be consistent with Harper,
the statute here must be read as though the PTAB judges had always been
constitutionally appointed, ‘disregarding’ the unconstitutional removal
provisions.”422 When the judicial fix is viewed as retroactive as it
properly should be, the prior hearings were not in fact “tainted with an
appointments violation,”423 so the relevant language from Lucia (and
Ryder) is inapplicable.
Reviewing the relevant case law, Judge Dyk found that “the Supreme
Court has required a new hearing only where the appointment’s defect
417. Bedgear, 783 F. App’x at 1030 (Dyk, J., concurring).
418. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1338.
419. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Seila Law, Reynoldsville Casket,
Booker, and Williams).
420. Bedgear, 783 F. App’x at 1031 (Dyk, J., concurring) (“The difference between Lucia and
Arthrex is that the fix in Lucia was an agency fix, whereas the fix in Arthrex is a judicial fix.
Agencies and legislatures generally act only prospectively . . . .”).
421. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n.6 (2018) (“While this case was on judicial
review, the SEC issued an order ratifying the prior appointments of its ALJs.”).
422. Bedgear, 783 F. App’x at 1032 (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803)).
423. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995)); supra
note 229 and accompanying text.
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had not been cured or where the cure was the result of non-judicial
action.”424 He also noted that the Arthrex panel’s contrary decision
“creates a host of problems in identifying the point in time when the
appointments became valid,” asking: “Is it when the panel issues the
decision, when the mandate issues, when en banc review is denied, when
certiorari is denied, or (if there is an en banc proceeding) when the en
banc court affirms the panel, or (if the Supreme Court grants review)
when the Supreme Court affirms the court of appeals decision?”425 As
discussed above, one of the practical benefits of retroactivity is that it
provides an elegant solution to this effective date problem; the court is
merely stating what was always the law.426
In Judge Dyk’s view, the Arthrex court’s striking of the “application
of the removal restrictions in [Title 5] to APJs” was “part constitutional
interpretation and part statutory construction.”427 Both statutory
invalidation and statutory construction are presumptively retroactive
under established law,428 and none of the Arthrex opinions provide any
reason why an as-applied severance, which is essentially a combination
of the two, should be treated as an exception to the general principles of
retroactivity set forth in Supreme Court precedent.
Unsurprisingly, a petition for rehearing en banc was filed in Arthrex,
but it was denied.429 Judge Dyk dissented from the denial, making
essentially the same arguments regarding retroactivity as he had made in
his Bedgear concurrence.430 These arguments elicited a number of
responses from other Federal Circuit judges concurring in the denial of
petition for rehearing en banc.
Leading off was Judge Moore who, having written the panel decision
in Arthrex, reiterated her view that “the APJs were constitutionally
appointed as of the implementation of the severance.”431 She pointed out
that the resulting “number of appeals that needed to be remanded based
on Appointments Clause challenges raised on appeal” had been limited
by the subsequent Federal Circuit panel decision in Customedia, which
had held that Appointments Clause challenges not raised prior to or in the

424. Bedgear, 783 F. App’x at 1034.
425. Id. at 1034, n.8.
426. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
427. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 953 F.3d 760, 766, 776 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Dyk, J.,
dissenting).
428. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing various ways to state the fact that
retroactivity voids previous interpretations of the law).
429. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 953
F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex 141 U.S. 549 (2020).
430. Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 769 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 764 (Moore, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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appellant’s opening brief had been waived.432
Apparently treating the “effective date” of the fix as Halloween 2019,
the date of the panel decision, Judge Moore counted that “no more than
81 appeals including Arthrex itself can be vacated and remanded based
on preserved Appointments Clause violations,” such that the “Arthrex
decision will result in at most 81 remands,” and stated that these remands
would be relatively “narrow in scope,” given that the Arthrex panel had
left it to the PTAB’s discretion whether to allow additional briefing or
reopen the record, such that in her view there was only “minimal
disruption to the inter partes review system.”433 Judge Moore’s count of
a maximum of 81 remands is not easy to square with the subsequent
USPTO order staying over one hundred remanded matters pending
certiorari petitions, with more remands expected to come.434 Regardless,
even if the PTAB chooses not to reopen briefing or the record, each of
the remands still requires a new hearing before a new panel of APJs, as
well as a new final written decision which could then be appealed to the
Federal Circuit, so the remands are not without significant delay,
expense, and disruption.
Judge Moore did not much elaborate on her view that the Court’s
decision in Lucia required that “Arthrex, and the other appeals with
preserved Appointments Clause challenges, were vacated and remanded
for hearings before new panels of APJs, who are now properly
appointed.”435 In her view, the “panel of APJs that decided the inter
partes review in this case [as in the other remanded cases] was not
constitutionally appointed when it rendered that decision,” such that to
“forgo vacatur as Judge Dyk suggests would be in direct contrast with
Lucia and would undermine any incentive a party may have to raise an
Appointments Clause challenge.”436 But Judge Moore did not address
Judge Dyk’s distinction: that Lucia had not involved a judicial fix.
As mentioned above, the incentive concern noted by Judge Moore at
best supports a discretionary remand as a reward in the Arthrex case itself
(not in the dozens of other remanded cases) and even this is questionable,
for it is not clear that such a reward is necessary in civil litigation where
repeat players often have incentives to raise structural challenges
432. Id. (citing Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 941 F.3d 1174, 1175 (Fed.
Cir. 2019)).
433. See Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 764 (explaining that the Arthrex decision will result in a maximum
of 81 remands); Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1340; see also Caterpillar Paving Prods. Inc., v. Wirtgen Am.,
Inc., 957 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (denying a remand because the PTAB final written decision
on appeal had issued prior to the Arthrex decision of Halloween 2019).
434. See infra note 458 discussing a USPTO Order that held all cases remanded under Arthrex
in administrative abeyance until the Supreme Court can act).
435. Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 764 n.3.
436. Id.
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impacting future litigation.437 Selective remands should be thought of not
as different treatment for purposes of choice-of-law (which is best viewed
as purely retroactive), but rather as an exercise of remedial discretion,
where consideration of individual equities is proper under the Court’s
jurisprudence.438
Next up was Judge O’Malley, who did attempt to address Judge Dyk’s
proposed distinction from Lucia in her own concurrence in the denial,
responding that, in her view, “judicial severance of one portion of an
unconstitutional statute is, by necessity, only applicable prospectively . . .
[A] new hearing before a new panel of APJs is the only appropriate
remedy for those whose proceedings were tainted by the constitutional
violation.”439 In support of her claim that partial judicial severance is “by
necessity, only applicable prospectively,” Judge O’Malley pointed to
Booker, where she claims “the Supreme Court made clear that judicial
severance of a statute is necessarily a prospective act.”440 And again, she
stated that “judicial severance is not a ‘remedy’; it is a forward-looking
judicial fix.”441
These claims about judicial severance being necessarily prospective
not only fly in the face of substantial Supreme Court authority
establishing that judicial constructions and invalidations of statutes are at
least presumptively retroactive,442 but are also directly contrary to even
Booker itself, where the Court held that its judicial severance did have to
apply retroactively in accord with foundational retroactivity
principles.443 Judge O’Malley is correct to say that under Booker
437. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (concluding that once
a rule of law is applied in one case, it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural
requirements).
438. See James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 543–44 (discussing choice of law and remedial issues).
439. Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 767 n.2 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
440. Id. at 767 n.2; id. at 768 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005)). Judge
O’Malley also pointed to Intercollegiate Broadcasting, which as discussed supra, is arguably
contrary to the approach of this Article, but is a DC Circuit case and thus not binding on the Federal
Circuit. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (holding that Copyright Royalty Judges were
appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause).
441. Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 767.
442. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing how the Chevron Oil rule is rarely
used); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 620 (3d ed.
2001) (“We are not aware of any statutory case in which the Supreme Court has, since [1961],
applied its ruling prospectively.”).
443. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Mr. Booker was found guilty before a jury
of committing offenses warranting a maximum of 21 years and 10 months in prison, but then the
judge held a post-trial sentencing proceeding in accord with the Sentencing Guidelines and
increased the sentence to 30 years. Id. at 227. The Court held that this aspect of the Sentencing
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, and severed provisions making the Guidelines
mandatory so that they could operate in a constitutional manner. Id. at 245–46. Given that Mr.
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“individuals adjudged under the statute as originally written are still
entitled to a remedy if their cases are pending on direct review,”444 but
this is a matter of remedial discretion and should be determined primarily
based on whether the individual was in fact somehow harmed by the prior
(mis)representation of the statute. Booker itself at least implies as much
in stating that whether a new hearing is warranted “may depend upon
application of the harmless-error doctrine.”445
Nothing in Booker carves out a judicial severance exception to
foundational principles of judicial retroactivity. When a criminal
defendant is subjected to a harsher sentence based on a later invalidated
statutory misrepresentation as in Booker, they are clearly harmed, and
should be granted a rehearing under the corrected statute. But it would be
a stretch to say that any of the appellants from the PTAB were harmed in
any actual way by the statutory mirage of removal restrictions on APJs.
Unsurprisingly, no such allegation of actual harm is contained in the
court’s opinions, but the court did not view the lack of actual harm as
relevant because the court incorrectly viewed remand as required by law
rather than a matter of remedial discretion. The Federal Circuit thus failed
to recognize that as a matter of choice-of-law; there is no doubt that the
court’s severance of the statute at least presumptively operates fully
retroactively in accord with foundational principles of retroactivity.446
Both Judge Moore and Judge O’Malley, in their concurrences from
Booker had been sentenced more harshly than he would have been under the current (correct)
version of the statute, the Court vacated his sentence. Id. at 267–68. The Court noted that it was
required to apply this corrected interpretation of the Sentencing Act to all cases other on direct
review as required by general retroactivity doctrine. Id. at 268 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314, 328 (1987); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995); Harper v. Va.
Dept. of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)).
444. Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 768.
445. Booker, 543 U.S. at 268 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential
doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the
‘plain-error’ test . . . . whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be sufficient to
review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon application of the harmless-error
doctrine.”) (emphasis added).
446. See, e.g., Beswick, supra note 358 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence . . .
recognizes a strong presumption of adjudicative retroactivity . . . .”). Thus, although Judge
O’Malley accuses Judge Dyk of “confus[ing] the remedy the panel deemed appropriate in this case
with the constitutional fix it deemed necessary,” Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 766, ironically it seems to be
at least arguably Judge O’Malley and the court as a whole who do just that. The accusation is
perhaps doubly ironic given that Judge Dyk (before joining the bench) actually argued
Reynoldsville (discussed supra) before the Supreme Court, which is one of the primary Court
decisions discussing the choice-of-law versus remedial discretion distinction in retroactivity, and
in doing so Judge Dyk advanced that distinction, an argument that the Court referred to as
“ingenious[]” but nevertheless rejected as inappropriate under the facts. See Reynoldsville Casket
Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (explaining that Hyde “ingeniously” asks the court to look
at what the Ohio Supreme Court did through the lens of remedy instead of retroactivity); see also
Beske, supra note 7, at 691–92 (recounting from oral argument now-Judge Dyk’s back and forth
with Justice Ginsberg on the choice of law issue).
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denial of rehearing en banc, pointed to a government brief that “rejected”
Judge Dyk’s retroactivity suggestion.447 But presumptive judicial
retroactivity is grounded in Article III and Supreme Court precedent as
an inherent characteristic of the judicial power,448 so an executive branch
brief cannot override that foundational jurisprudential requirement. The
government brief argues that remands are necessary because the Arthrex
decision did not “eliminate the impact of the asserted constitutional
violation on the original agency decision,” but tellingly provides no
suggestion of what such impact might have been.449
Judge O’Malley’s discussion of Harper further illuminates the
important distinction between remedial discretion and choice-of-law. In
Harper, the Court held that a Virginia tax statute was unconstitutional
based on a prior Court decision (Davis), and that the Supreme Court of
Virginia had erred in refusing to apply Davis retroactively.450 So, the
Court in Harper held as a matter of choice-of-law that the invalidation of
the statute had to be considered retroactive.451 But the Court remanded to
allow the state courts to address the appropriate remedy, which the state
courts ultimately determined to be a refund of the taxes that had been
collected under the retroactively invalid statute.452
Discussing Harper, Judge O’Malley points out that “the Court’s ruling
that the state taxes at issue had been collected unconstitutionally did not
remedy the harm caused by the unlawful collection of taxes,” and argues
that similarly, “our curative severance of the statute, does not ‘remedy’
the harm to Arthrex.”453 The difference though, is that the prior statutory
misrepresentation caused clear harm in Harper but no harm at all in
Arthrex. Of course, when taxes are collected under a statute that properly
viewed did not exist at the time, a refund of those taxes must at least be
considered because but for the invalid statute’s misrepresentation of the
law, the taxes clearly would not have been collected.454 That is, under the
447. See Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 764 n.3, 767 (citing Supp. Br. of United States, Polaris Innovations
Ltd. V. Kingston Tech. Co., Nos. 2018-1768, -1831 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
448. See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining
that retroactivity has historically been viewed as “an inherent characteristic of the judicial
power . . . .”).
449. See Supp. Br. of United States, supra note 447, at 14 (noting that the APJs did not
understand themselves to be subject to removal at will when they made their decisions).
450. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (holding explicitly that the Supreme Court of
Virginia must apply Davis).
451. Harper, 509 U.S. at 92 (noting that the Virginia law was unconstitutional).
452. See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text (explaining that the Harper Court
effectively demanded Virginia come up with a remedy without saying what remedy it should be).
453. See Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 767 (explaining that the Court’s severance of the statute only
prevents that type of harm in the future).
454. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
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current corrected statement of the law, the government clearly lacked
authority for actions taken.
But again, in Arthrex, there was no apparent reliance on or harm caused
by the statutory misrepresentation. Under the current corrected statement
of the law, nothing would have been different because the court fixed
rather than invalidated the relevant statutory provisions. Unlike Harper’s
statutory invalidation, the fix in Arthrex did not remove the authority for
disputed governmental actions already taken. Any argument that the
invalid representation of removal restrictions made any difference to
these remanded cases would be tenuous, and in any event, no such
argument is advanced by Judge O’Malley, or by the government in the
cited brief, or in any of the court’s relevant opinions for that matter.
In other words, the question one must ask is, viewing the court’s asapplied severance as having been the law all along, was any unlawful
action taken? In Harper, the answer is clearly yes, the collection of taxes
was unlawful without a valid tax statute; but in Arthrex, the answer is
almost certainly no. As such, unlike in Harper, the prudent use of
remedial discretion counsels against a remand in Arthrex. That is, Judge
O’Malley is not wholly incorrect to state that a “decision that the statute
can be rendered constitutional by severance does not remedy any past
harm,”455 but where there is not even an allegation of any such actual past
harm whatsoever, a remedial rehearing is both imprudent and
unnecessary. To be sure, the inquiry about whether the misrepresentation
of law made a difference can be a difficult one, but it is one that the courts
should at least attempt to engage with in exercising their equitable
discretion on whether a remand is appropriate. One factor to consider in
the Appointments Clause context might be the degree of political
discretion that the relevant officers exercised. In the case of the APJs, the
degree of political discretion is low, in part because the questions are
primarily legal and technical and are reviewed by the Federal Circuit. As
such, it seems quite unlikely that any of the cases would have been
decided differently if the relevant APJs had known that they were in fact
removable at will.
This can indeed be somewhat confusing, so to state it differently one
more time, as a matter of choice-of-law, the “new” “fixed” law is
constitutional whereas the “old” law was not. If the new law is applied
only prospectively, then cases decided under the old law were decided
under an unconstitutional agency structure (assuming that the declaration

(“[I]f a plaintiff seeks the return of money taken by the government in reliance on an
unconstitutional tax law, the court ignores the tax law, finds the taking of the property therefore
wrongful, and provides a remedy.”).
455. Arthrex, 953 F.3d at 767 (asserting that only meaningful prospective relief can be offered).
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of unconstitutionality is retroactive) and must be remanded. But if the
“new” law is applied retroactively, as it generally should be, there is no
error and no need for a remand; however, a remand might still be granted
in some cases as a matter of remedial discretion, for example, if there is
some reason to think that the old misrepresentation of the law (e.g., the
removal restrictions) impacted and harmed a litigant,456 or perhaps as an
incentive creating reward to the first litigant to win the Appointments
Clause challenge.
Part of what makes retroactivity particularly confusing in this context
is that the change in law at issue sometimes fixes rather than invalidates
the law. A criminal defendant who is able to invalidate the law under
which they were convicted would normally want that change in law to
apply retroactively, such that the law they were convicted under was void
ab initio, and their conviction cannot stand. The change in law in that
situation invalidates the prior law. But where the change in law fixes the
prior law, as it did in Arthrex, the complainant does not necessarily want
the fix to apply retroactively, because that could undercut their
entitlement to a new hearing. This is coupled with the fact that standing
(specifically traceability) requirements have been loosened in the
Appointments Clause context,457 so it cannot be easily or automatically
assumed that the prior misrepresentation of law had any actual effect on
the litigants.
Not wanting to waste its time, on May 1, 2020 the USPTO perhaps
wisely stayed the Arthrex-related remands pending any relevant petitions
for certiorari.458 The USPTO order listed and stayed over 103 decisions
and expected that number to increase.459 Certiorari was ultimately

456. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 593–94 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Perhaps in some instances
such an officer’s actions should be invalidated. The theory would be that a new President would
want to remove the incumbent officer to instill his own selection, or maybe that an independent
officer would act differently than if that officer were removable at will.”).
457. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court has
loosened standing requirements when it is difficult to know if an agency’s structure is
unconstitutional).
458. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Order in Cases Remanded Under
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
459. Id. at 1 (stating that remand orders based on Arthrex “have already vacated more than 100
decisions by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘Board’), and more such Orders are expected”).
Ninety-four of the 103 remanded and stayed proceedings were IPR proceedings. See id. at 2–6. The
others were from other types of USPTO agency proceedings, which have been found to be similarly
affected under the Federal Circuit’s Arthrex decision. See, e.g., In re JHO Intellectual Property
Holdings, LLC, No. 2019-2330, order at 1 (Fed. Cir. June 18, 2020) (moving to vacate the decision
of the PTAB and remand the case based on the Arthrex decision); Virtnetx Inc. v. Cisco Systems
Inc., No. 20-1671, slip op. at *3–4 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2020); In re Boloro Global Limited, No.
2019-2349, -2351, -2353 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2020).
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granted (on October 13, 2020), and the case was argued before the
Supreme Court on March 1, 2021.460
Recall that Ryder’s discussion of Buckley arguably suggests that
whether prior administrative actions should be granted de facto validity
depends on balancing the degree of disruption caused by not granting de
facto validity against the unfairness and harm to incentives that might be
caused by granting it, and that as discussed above, Professor Beske has
argued for this sort of balancing.461 This balancing would have
potentially supported a grant of de facto validity with respect to the
vacated PTAB decisions, given that the degree of disruption caused is
greater than in Ryder—roughly one hundred cases instead of merely
seven to ten462— and the unfairness and harm to incentives from granting
de facto validity would likely be less given that Arthrex is a civil case
whereas Ryder was criminal.
But a key point of this Article is that this balancing and the de facto
validity doctrine are not even necessary in the situation where the fix
comes from the judiciary, as in Arthrex, because foundational principles
of retroactivity should automatically at least presumptively confer
validity on the prior actions. Remands are still permissible as a matter of
remedial discretion, but they are not required, and should generally be the
exception rather than the rule, particularly where the prior
misrepresentation of law did not cause any apparent harm. Thus, although
the balancing suggested by Professor Beske might support a grant of de
facto validity in Arthrex, remands were unnecessary and at least mostly
imprudent for the additional and largely independent reason that the fix
was judicial. In other words, even if the remands are not sufficiently
burdensome to warrant a grant of de facto validity, the Federal Circuit
was still in error under retroactivity principles.
The Federal Circuit’s primary error was in viewing the remands as
required by law rather than merely permissible as a matter of remedial
discretion. Allowing reliance or actual harm to serve as a basis for remand

460. Arthrex, 941 F.3d 1320, cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Arthrex, 141 U.S. 549
(2020). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Arthrex, No. 19-1434 (June 29, 2020); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 953 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 191204) (This petition is in a different case between the same parties pertaining to a different patent,
U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541, rather than the ’907 patent.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Polaris
Innovations Ltd. v. Kingston Technology Company, Inc., No. 19-1459 (June 30, 2020); see also,
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Andrew Michaels Supporting No Party, Arthrex, No. 19-1434
(Dec. 1, 2020).
461. See supra notes 364–371 and accompanying text (arguing that applying a balancing test
for unfairness to individual litigants is consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and
asserting it is the only way to stave off negative consequences).
462. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (bringing attention to the fact that the Court in
Ryder thought seven to ten cases was an acceptable number of cases to be affected).

704

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

might seem contrary to the Court’s decision in Reynoldsville, which had
seemed to say that possible reliance alone cannot be a basis for remedial
discretion prospectivity, if Harper is to have more than symbolic
significance.463 But there is a distinction in that in Reynoldsville, a litigant
relied on a prior representation of law in waiting to bring suit, but there
was no government action taken in reliance on that representation; the
“old” law in Reynoldsville was a more lenient statute of limitations, and
the requested nonretroactive relief was essentially a waiver of the “new”
shorter limitations period—relief that does not naturally fall into the
category of a remedy.464 Another distinction is that nothing about a
remand would continue to violate the Constitution in Arthrex, as a
remedial remand would have in Reynoldsville.465 Reynoldsville urged
caution in employing the choice-of-law versus remedial discretion
distinction, but it did not eviscerate the distinction, and a remaining
degree remedial discretion is consistent with the Court’s subsequent
statement in Ryder that one who makes a timely Appointments Clause
challenge is entitled to “whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation
indeed occurred,” as well as with the Court’s suggestion in Booker that
remedies in retroactivity situations may be governed by principles of
harmless error.466 In any event, even if one were to view Reynoldsville as
eliminating the remedial discretion versus choice-of-law distinction, the
result would be no remands at all—the opposite of that reached by the
Federal Circuit.
Considered as discretionary, the Arthrex court likely would have found
at least most of the remands imprudent, given the lack of any plausible
harm due to the prior statutory misrepresentation. In the unlikely event
that litigants in certain cases were able to provide some particular reason
why the statutory mirage of removal restrictions may have made a
difference to their case, then perhaps a discretionary remand may be
warranted in those rare cases. Absent that, a discretionary remand was at
most warranted in the Arthrex case itself as an incentive-based reward for
the challenge, but not in the dozens of other remanded cases.

463. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s concerns in
Reynoldsville about choice of law principles)
464. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 756 (1995)(“[T]he Ohio Supreme
Court’s ‘remedy’ here (allowing Hyde to proceed) does not cure the tolling statute’s problem of
unconstitutionality.”).
465. Id. at 756 (explaining that respondent Hyde’s “tort claim critically depends upon Ohio
tolling law that continues to violate the Commerce Clause.”).
466. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995) (explaining that, if a violation in
fact occurred, one who makes a timely Appointments Clause challenge is entitled to an appropriate
remedy); see also supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Retroactivity in the Appointments Clause and related constitutional
contexts presents issues that can be confusing and deserve special
consideration. This is in part because the Supreme Court has loosened
traceability requirements in this area, allowing challenges to agency structure
to be raised even where they are unlikely to have had any actual effect on the
case. When an Appointments Clause or other similar constitutional
challenge to agency structure is successful, whether prior agency actions are
invalid turns in part on whether the court “fixed” the problem by striking or
interpreting parts of the relevant statute. That is, courts should consider
whether the prior agency actions at issue could have been taken under the
law as currently stated, or whether the authority for such actions has instead
been removed.
If there is no judicial fix, then prior agency actions taken under the
authority of invalid statutory provisions or by improperly appointed judges
presumptively must be vacated if those agency actions have not yet become
final after appeal to the judiciary, unless the court chooses to employ the
rarely used de facto validity doctrine. In deciding whether to employ this
doctrine, courts should balance the degree of administrative disruption that
would be caused by invalidating the prior agency actions against any
unfairness to litigants and harm to incentives that might be caused by
granting such actions de facto validity. Such a balancing would be
reasonable and not inconsistent with current doctrine.
But where the court does judicially “fix” the problem, the analysis is both
conceptually and practically different—essentially the presumption should
be flipped. This presumptive turnabout positively reflects foundational
retroactivity principles, and normatively is consistent with the notion that a
constitutional issue that can be fixed by the courts should generally tend to
be less serious than one that cannot, and should thus in general tend to
warrant a less disruptive remedy.
A judicial fix must at least presumptively be, and generally should be,
applied retroactivity across the board as a matter of choice-of-law, such that
the fix has no “effective date” and the agency structure is rendered
constitutional both in the past and the future. Invalidation of prior agency
actions is thus unnecessary but may be granted as a matter of remedial
discretion, depending on the equities of each individual case. A discretionary
remand in the initial case that won the structural constitutional challenge may
be warranted to incentivize such challenges. But remands in other pending
cases are generally imprudent unless there is some reason to think that those
cases were actually impacted by the prior unconstitutional misrepresentation
of law, particularly where vacating the agency’s prior actions would
significantly disrupt or burden the agency at issue, or cause unnecessary
waste and delay.

